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ABSTRACT

THE MARKET POWER. - EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF,
RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY ANALYSIS,
AND THE USAIR - PIEDMONT MERGER
John Stephen Stockum
Supervisor: Dr. Almarin Phillips
Topics in antitrust theory, empirical analysis, and policy are
examined, with an application to the USAir-Piedmont merger. The first
chapter presents Cournot models to assess the welfare tradeoff between
increases in market power and increases in efficiency that may result from
a merger. The magnitudes of efficiency gain sufficient to satisfy two
alternative welfare standards are derived. To satisfy the first standard,
the efficiency gain must be sufficient to offset the deadweight loss
created by increased market power. To satisfy the second standard, the
efficiency gain must be sufficient to offset the incentive to increase
prices resulting from increased market power. In both cases, the critical
efficiency gains derived offset the effects of the mergers that are
determined endogenously within the model, rather than effects that are
predetermined. Results are presented for a range of assumptions about
the number of firms, the pre-merger markup· of price over marginal cos t,
and fixed costs.
The second chapter evaluates the method of residual demand
elasticity analysis.
The relationship between residual demand
elasticities and market power is examined. Alternative methods for making
inferences of post-merger market power using estimates of pre-merger
residual demand elasticities also are examined.
The third chapter estimates and analyzes residual demand
elasticities for the USAir-Piedmont merger. Five routes on which the two
firms competed prior to the merger are examined. Pre-merger time-series
data is used to estimate pre-merger, pos c-mexger , and market residual
demand elasticities for each route.
The results suggest that a
significant degree of market power existed on some routes prior to the
merger and that increased market power appears likely to result from the
merger on some routes.
Other routes exhibit highly elastic residual
demand in spite of high levels of market concentration.
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CHAPTER 1
THE MARKET POWER - EFFICIENCY TRADEOFF

IN A COURNOT MODEL

Once economies are admitted as a defense, the
tools for assessing these effects can be expected
progressively to be refined
solemn
references to early oratory might finally be
displaced in favor of analysis in the continuing
dialogue in antitrust enforcement. (Williamson,
1968, p. 34)

I. Introduction
Some mergers may result in increases in both market power and
efficiency.

Williamson

(1968) shows that the deadweight loss due to a

given price increase can be offset by a gain of producer surplus due to
a relatively small efficiency gain.
to illustrate the tradeoff.
offset given price

This paper presents Cournot models

Rather than deriving the cost reductions that

increases, as Williamson

does, I derive the cost

reductions that offset endogenously determined price increases due to a
given change in market concentration.
In addition, I distinguish between two alternative standards for the
degree of cost reduction that offsets market power increases.

A cost

reduction meets the "Williamson standard" if it is sufficient to offset
the deadweight loss and thus prevent total surplus from falling.
if this standard is met, a redistribution
still may result.
standard"

However,

from consumers to producers

The alternative and more stringent "consumer surplus

is based on the fact that prices are a direct function of

marginal costs, and thus an efficiency gain in the form of a reduction in
marginal

costs

results

in a price

reduction.

The consumer

surplus

standard is met if the marginal cost reduction is sufficient to offset the
1

incentive to increase prices due to increased market power, and thus
prevent consumer surplus from falling.

Williamson does not address the

important effect of efficiency gains on prices.
The Cournot model, in which price is an inverse function of the
number of firms, is used in this paper to provide several illustrations
of the welfare tradeoff.

The results indicate the direction and magnitude

of effect of market concentration, cost structure, and markup of price
over marginal

cost

on the determination

of

the critical

values

of

efficiency gains.

The results can be adjusted to reflect conjectural

variations

than

other

significantly

Cournot

conjectures,

and

such

adjustments

affect the derived critical values of cost reductions.

However, such generalizations of the model appear to remove much of its
ability to explain the impact of industry variables on the market powerefficiency tradeoff.

Indeed, it is interesting, but not particularly

useful, to illustrate that a wide range of effiCiency gain may be required
by a given welfare criterion depending on the value of the pre-merger and
post-merger conjectural variation.
Cournot models,

though they do not contain

the full range of

industry possibilities, provide an interesting simplified illustration of
many

important aspects of the welfare

tradeoff issue.

There

is no

intention to suggest that the Cournot model's assumptions are realistic
or that its results are typical.

However, it should be noted that the

Cournot assumption is not the only determinant of the relationship between
price and number of firms; thus the model permits a significant degree of
generality.

2

"

While chapter 1 uses a Cournot model, the empirical model introduced
in chapter 2 and estimated

in chapter 3 does not rely on behavioral

assumptions such as Cournot.

Restrictive assumptions about competitive

behavior, while they often are necessary in order to structure theoretical
analysis such as that in this chapter, should not be included in empirical
models that attempt to measure market performance.
The results in this chapter illustrate the significant difference
between the magnitudes of efficiency gains that are required to satisfy
the two welfare standards.

For example, a particular merger in a five-

firm industry requires a 1.5%
Williamson

marginal cost reduction

to satisfy the

standard and a 10% marginal cost reduction

to satisfy the

consumer surplus standard.
The significant difference between the two standards implies that
the choice of a standard is an important prerequisite for policymakers'
consideration
historically

of

efficiencies

as

a mitigating

have not considered efficiency

factor.

The

courts

gains to be a mitigating

factor in merger cases and have even considered them to be an aggravating
factor because
monopolize.

cost advantages may serve to increase the ability to

Although the 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines place

increased emphasis on efficiency gains (compare 1982 Guidelines, section
4 and 1984 Guidelines, section 3.5), the Guidelines are ambiguous about
what

degree

of efficiency

gains

is required.

The

1984 Guidelines

specifically mention the price-reducing effect of efficiency gains and do
not mention the deadweight-loss-offsetting effect.

Thus it might appear

that the DOJ favors the more stringent consumer surplus standard.

3

Yet

this standard has received little attention in the literature.

(A notable

exception is Fi~her, Johnson, and Lande, 1989.)
In part II, I present a simple Cournot model and derive the marginal
cost reductions that meet the Williamson standard.

In part III, I derive

the cost reductions that meet the Williamson standard for the case where
the efficiency gain occurs in the form of a reduction in fixed cost.
part IV, I derive the cost reductions
standard.

that meet the consumer

In

surplus

In part V, I derive the cost reductions for both standards in

a model in which firms are not assumed to be of equal size, in order to
represent more realistically the asymmetric nature of the pre-merger and
post-merger market share distribution.

II. The Model and the Williamson Standard
Consider an industry with n firms producing a homogeneous commodity
with no fixed costs and constant marginal cost, denoted cn•

The inverse

market demand function is characterized by the linear expression Pn-a-bQn,
a>O, b>O, where Qn is the total industry output.
producer) surplus in the industry is

Cournot-Nash equilibrium values are
(1. 2)

Pn

a+ncn
n+1

(1. 3)

Qn

nqn

(1.4)

qn

Substituting

__
a-c n
b(n+1)
(1.3) and (1.4) into (1.1),

4

Total (consumer plus

(1.5)

n(n+2)
(n+l)2

wn -

~Z

2b

Now consider a change in the number of firms from n+l to n.

Rather

than imposing a certain degree of cost reduction and analyzing the welfare
effects. the proportional

difference between cn and cn+l that satisfies

alternative welfare standards will be derived.

The difference in total

surplus between the industry with n firms and with n+l firms is
n(n+2) (a-cnlz
2b(n+l)2

(1. 6)

(n+l) (n+3) (a-cn+112
2b(n+2)2

To determine the magnitude
Williamson

welfare

standard.

of cost reduction

1. e.

that

is

that satisfies the

sufficient

to offset

the

deadweight loss due to the price increase endogenously determined in the
Cournot model. set (1.6) equal to zero and solve for cn:
(1. 7)

(a-cn12
(a-cn+l)2

(n+3) (n+l)3
n(n+2)z

-

N

N is defined for notational simplicity.

Normalizing so that a-l.

Equation (1.8) is the derived critical relationship between cn and
cn+l that satisfies the Williamson welfare standard.
difference between
initial value of

cn and cn+l implicit

Cn+l

assumed.

L

-

is

cn+l.

Substituting
(1.11)

cn -

on the

Define the (n+1)-firm markup as

In+l.:.£n+l
cn+l

Then substitute Pn+1 from (1.2) into (1.9) and solve for
(1.10)

dependent

By assuming an initial value for Cn+l' we

implicitly impose a pre-merger markup.
(1. 9)

in (1. 8)

The proportional

1/(Ln+2L+2) •
(1.10) into (1.8) yields
1 - L(n+2)JN
1+L(n+2) .
5

We are primarily interested in the critical value of the percentage
change in costs, 1.e. in
(1.12)

c*

Substituting (1.10) and (1.11) into (1.12) yields
c*

(1.13)

L(n+2) (jN-1)

So c* in (1.13) is the percentage cost reduction that is sufficient
to offset the deadweight loss due to a reduction in the number of firms
from n+1 to n.
number of firms.

Note that c* is a function only of the markup and the
Note also that because markup appears multiplicatively

in (1.13), a percentage markup twice as great necessitates

a percentage

cost reduction twice as great.
Table 1.1 was compiled from equation (1.13) for various combinations
of markups and numbers of firms.

(The market demand elasticities implicit

in these calculations are given in parentheses under each figure; they are
arc elasticities calculated between the n-firm price and the (n+1)-firm
price.)

So, for example, if a four firm (n+1-4) industry has a markup of

20%, the loss of one firm (n-3) will not result in a welfare
average cost is reduced by at least 1.2%.

6

loss if

TABLE 1.1
c·-Percentage Reduction in Marginal C~st that Satisfies
the Williamson Standard for a Reduction in the Number
of Firms from n+l to n
L

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

.027
(6.1)

.053
(3.4)

.079
(2.5)

.133
(1.8)

2

.005 .011
(7.7) (3.9)

.022
(2.1)

.032
(1.6)

.054
(1.1)

3

.003 .006
(5.4) (2.8)

.012
(1.6)

.018
(1.1)

.030
(0.8)

4

.002 .004
(4.4) (2.3)

.008
(1.2)

.011
(0.9)

.019
(0.6)

5

.001 .003
(2.6) (1.9)

.005
(1. 0)

.008
(0.8)

.013
(0.5)

1

.013
(11)

n

In this model, the price increase due to a merger is inversely
related to the number of firms in the industry.
and the cost reduction

Thus the deadweight loss

called for by the welfare

standard

also are

inversely related to the number of firms.
The inverse relationship between markup and market demand elasticity
can be seen in table 1.1: the endogenously determined price increase due
to a merger also is inversely related to the market demand elasticity.
Thus the deadweight loss and the cost reduction called for by the welfare
standard are direct functions of the number of firms.
The small degree of efficiency gain that is sufficient to offset the
anticompetitive
markets
artifact

welfare loss caused by mergers in highly concentrated

in this model may appear anomalous.
of the linearity

assumptions
7

or

This result is not an

the assumption

of Cournot

behavior.

Rather,

this result is largely due to the fact that the

efficiency gain modelled accrues to the entire range of output while the
deadweight loss accrues only in the range of the output restriction caused
by the increase in market power.
reduction
deadweight

multiplied

Thus a very small percentage

by a large level of output

easily exceeds

cost
the

loss triangle within the much smaller range of the output

reduction.
It also is apparent, both in table 1.1 and in the following tables,
that reductions in the number of competitors do not appear to have a very
significant affect on pricing when there are more than about three firms
in the industry.

If these theoretical

results were consistent with

marketplace reality, it would appear that antitrust policy should focus
on mergers only in industries that are much more highly concentrated than
the markets that are referred to as "highly concentrated" in the Justice
Department's

Merger

Guidelines

(1984, section

inferences may not be appropriate.
judgements

3.11).

However,

such

It may be more appropriate to make

about the threshold values

of the Merger

Guidelines

from

empirical evidence, rather than from numbers that are derived from purely
theoretical models.

Indeed, certain theoretical models may yield highly

monopolistic results at low levels of market concentration that contrast
sharply with the Cournot model, and it may not be concluded easily that
the assumptions of one model are more realistic than those of the other.
Alternatively, it may be the case that two or three competitors are enough
to prevent prices from greatly exceeding marginal cost in many industries.
But examination of theoretical models is unlikely to strongly support
either hypothesis.

8
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III. Fixed Costs
Efficiency gains may arise in the form of fixed cost savings, rather
than marginal cost reductions.

For example, merging firms may close down

a plant and thus save the fixed costs of operating that plant, while
marginal production costs remain unchanged.

Let cn-c for all n.

Given

fixed costs, the loss of a firm due to a merger results in each remaining
firm expanding

its output and thus reducing

its average cost.

reduction in average cost will be greater the larger are fixed costs.

The
If

fixed costs are large enough, the deadweight loss will be offset by the
fixed

cost

To

savings.

determine

what

level

of

fixed

costs

is

sufficiently large for this to be the case, define f as a firm's fixed
costs so that (1.6) becomes
n(n+2) (a-c)2
2b(n+l)2

fn -

(n+l)(n+3)(a-c)2 + f(n+l) .
2b(n+2)2

Setting (1.14) - zero, defining N', and solving for f,
(1.15)

f

~2
2b

(n+l)3(n+3)-n(n+2)2
(n+1)2(n+2)2

N' (a-c)2

2b
so that f in (1.15) is the critical value of fixed cost.
derive the percentage

In order to

change in average cost that is implied by the

critical value of fixed cost in (1.15), define c·· as the percentage
change in average cost:
(1.16)

c.*

c+f tOn+1 - (c+ftoni
c + f/qn+l

Substituting q's from_(1.4) and f from (1.15) into (1.16),
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(1.17)

c**

N' (l-c)

N' (l-c) (n+2)+2c
Then substituting c from (l.lq) (i.e. marginal cost as a function of
markup and the number of firms; note that markup in this case refers to
markup of price over marginal cost, not average cost.) into (1.17),
(1.18)

c **

N' (Ln+2L+1)
N'(Ln+2L+1)(n+2)+2

Table 1.2 was compiled from equation (1.18).

So, for example, if

a five firm (n+1-5) industry has a markup of 20%, the loss of a firm (n-4)
will not result in a welfare loss if average cost is reduced by at least
1.2%.

Note that the economy is due only to the saving of one firm's fixed

cost; marginal costs are held constant in this example.
TABLE 1.2
c**-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies the
Williamson Standard for a Reduction in the Number of Firms
from n+l to n: Fixed Cost Case
L
.05

n

.10

.20

.30

.50

1

.064

.071

.083

.095

.114

2

.026

.030

.037

.044

.056

3

.013

.016

.020

.025

.033

4

.008

.009

.012

.016

.021

5

.005

.006

.008

.011

.015

The marginal cost reductions in Part II reduced the price increase
endogenously determined by the reduction in the number of firms.
fixed cost case, cost savings do not affect pricing.

In the

Thus, the deadweight

losses are larger in the fixed cost case, and thus the values in table 1.2
are significantly higher than those in table 1.1.
10

IV. The Consumer Surplus Standard
Marginal cost reductions reduce firms' profit-maximizing prices, as
is seen in equation (1.2).

In Part II the cost reduction reduces the

price increase due to increased market power, thus also reducing the
deadweight

loss relative to a merger in which there is no change in

marginal cost.

The price-reducing effect of an efficiency gain may be

sufficiently large to offset the price-increasing effect of the increased
market power.

Then because price does not fall, consumer surplus does not

fall, and there is a gain in producer surplus.

For both the fixed cost

case and the zero fixed cost case, to determine what cost reduction is
sufficient to keep the price from rising due to the loss of one firm,
simply set Pn+1-Pn from (1.2) and solve for cn. The critical value is
(1.19)

cn

(n+1) 2cn+1.:...S!
n(n+2)

Substituting (1.10) and (1.19) into (1.12) yields the simple expression
(1. 20)

c •• *

Lin

1.e. the percentage reduction in marginal cost sufficient to offset the
price-increasing effect of increased market power from n+l to n firms Is
simply the markup divided by the number of firms.

Table 1.3 was compiled

from equation (1.20). So, for example, if a five firm industry (n+1-5) has
a markup of 20%, the loss of a firm (n-4) will not result in a price
increase if marginal costs are reduced by 5%.

The critical values in

table 1.3 are much greater than those in table 1.1.

This difference

illustrates the importance of the choice of a welfare standard to the
magnitude of efficiency required.

11

TABLE 1.3
c***-Percentage Reduction in Marginal Cost
that Satisfies the Consumer Surplus Standard
for a Reduction in the Number of Firms from n+1 to n
L

n

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

1

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

2

.025

.05

.10

.15

.25

3

.017

.033

.067

.10

.167

4

.013

.025

.05

.075

.125

5

.01

.02

.04

.06

.10

V. Firm Asymmetry
The combination of two firms should be expected to result in a firm
"larger" than the individual pre-merger

firms.

Symmetric

such as those used in earlier sections, do not capture
asymmetric characteristics

of mergers.

firm models,

the inherently

In this section, I generalize the

model to allow firms to differ from each other.

In a symmetric (n+1)-firm

homogeneous good model, two pre-merger firms together have 2/(n+l) of the
market, while post-merger
the non-merging firms.

they have lIn of the market, the same share as

A "merger" in a symmetric firm model is not really

a merger, but rather is the exit of a firm, resulting in each remaining
firm increasing its market share proportionately.
an unrealistic characterization

In addition to being

of the post-merger distribution of market

share, symmetric firm models do not result in the firms having incentive
to merge in the first place, as Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) show.
DeGraba (1988) resolves the problem by simply having the post-merger firm
12

maintain

both

characterization

cost

functions

of

the

pre-merger

firms

(this

is equivalent to perfect collusion between two firms).

Thus the post-merger firm's cost function is the horizontal sum of the two
firms' pre-merger cost functions.
behavioral

This method is useful to illustrate the

asymmetry between the pre-merger and post-merger

state, but

does not permit us to characterize efficiency gains because the industry
cost structure does not change due to the merger.
Like DeGraba, Perry and Porter (1985) assume that the post-merger
firm maintains the assets (or capital stock) of the two pre-merger firms.
However, Perry and Porter assume a cost function in which the increased
capital

stock results

in a cost reduction.

A third manner

of firm

asymmetry exists if the industry has differentiated products and the new
firm maintains both "brands" from the merger partners (see Deneckere and
Davidson, 1983).
Another possibility is that firm asymmetry arises due to asymmetric
strategic behavior such as Stacke1berg competition. Daughety (1986) shows
that social welfare maximization in a Stacke1berg model implies that there
exists a significant amount of behavioral asymmetry (l.e. several leaders
as well as several followers).

Thus even without

efficiency

gains a

merger between two followers that results in their becoming a Stacke1berg
leader often will increase competition and thus also welfare.

In reality

a merger may involve cost, demand, and behavioral asymmetries.

In this

section the previous model will be adapted to account for cost asymmetry.
The assumptions of the previous model are maintained in this example
with

the

exception

of

the

cost

function.

Cost

asymmetry

can . be

characterized in many. different functional forms; the cost function used

13

was chosen for computational simplicity.

I assume that there is a factor

whose total supply to the industry is fixed; this factor will be referred
to as capital.

The capital may be distributed among the firms in any way,

thus any combination of firm sizes can be modelled.

For example in an

n-firm industry in which firms have equal shares of capital, each firm has
a capital share of ki-l/n.

If two of these firms merge, their combined

capital share is kij-2/n. This asset is assumed to enter the firms' cost
functions in the following way: firm i's total costs are
(1.21)

Ci(qi,ki)

(c+d/ki)qi

The extent to which a larger stock of the asset results in lower
unit costs is dependent on the relationship between c and d.
large

(small) relative

efficiency gain.

to d, a merger

results

in a

small

If c is
(large)

Rather than exogenously setting the relation between

these variables and thus also setting the degree of efficiency gain, the
critical relation that prevents a welfare loss will be derived.

The

formulation implies that the efficiency gain is specific to the firms
being merged, not industry-wide as in the earlier examples.
model

in

this

section

provides

a

reasonable

Thus the

interpretation

of

firm-specific efficiency gains as well as more adequately representing the
asymmetric nature of mergers and acquisitions.
in which
assets.

two firms. of a symmetric

We look first at a merger

(n+1)-firm industry combine

This model proceeds similarly to the earlier model.

their

The algebra

becomes rather copious, however, and thus only the results are presented
here.

Given the pre-merger markup the critical relationship between c and

d that results in a cost reduction sufficient to offset the deadweight
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is then converted

into a percentage

so that it can be compared to the earlier cases.

Thus c**** is the

loss

This

is derived.

result

reduction in unit costs:
(1.22)

c ****

percentage

c+d/k - (c+d/2k)
c+d/k

by

which

the

merger

partners'

unit

costs

exceed

their

pre-merger costs (and by which they exceed the other firms' costs which
remain unchanged after the merger).

The results are in table 1.4 and can

be interpreted similarly to the results in table 1.1.

For example. if two

firms from a symmetric three-firm industry with a pre-merger markup of 10%
merged, and thus controlled two-thirds of the industry's capital stock.
a 2% reduction in the merger partners' unit costs is sufficient to offset
the deadweight loss due to the price increase resulting from the merger.
TABLE 1.4
c****-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies
the Williamson Standard for a Merger Which Reduces the Number
of Firms from n+l to n: Asymmetric Firms Case
L

n

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

1

.014

.034

.056

.085

.141

2

.011

.021

.043

.064

.113

3

.009

.020

.039

.049

.100

4

.007

.015

.028

.044

.073

5

.006

.013

.025

.037

.053

Next, as in Part IV, the cost reduction sufficient to prevent the
post-merger price from exceeding the pre-merger price is derived for the
asymmetric-firm model.

Surprisingly. the number of firms drops out of the
15

derivation of the critical value in this case.

Not only is the percentage

cost reduction sufficient to result in the post-merger price equaling the
pre-merger price a function only of the pre-merger markup. but it equals
the pre-merger markup. regardless of the number of firms in the industry!
The results are presented in table 1.5.

For example. if two firms from

a symmetric n-firm industry with a pre-merger markup of 10% merged. and
thus controlled 2/n of the industry's capital stock, the merger will not
result in a price increase if a 10% cost reduction is realized by the
merger partners.
Because in the Cournot model the price increase due to a merger is
an inverse function of the number of firms in the industry. we should
expect that a smaller cost reduction should be necessary

to meet the

welfare standard the more firms there are in the industry.

In fact this

is what we observed in the earlier examples.

But because in this case the

efficiency gain occurs for the merging firms only. the smaller is the
combined market share of the merger partners.

the larger is the cost

reduction that is necessary to offset a given price increase.

These two

effects offset each other exactly given the assumptions of this example.
The effect of having the efficiency gain accrue only to the merger
partners also can be seen in table 1.4. Although c···· is still an inverse
function of the number of firms in the industry, its rate of decrease is
much slower than in the previous examples.

Again this is because the

efficiency gain occurs only for the merger partners. thus the smaller is
their market share. the greater is the cost reduction that is necessary
to offset a given deadweight loss.

Also. comparing tables 1.4 and 1.5.

we can see that the consumer surplus standard requires a much greater
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efficiency

gain than the Williamson

standard,

as we saw in comparing

tables 1.1 and 1.2.

TABLE 1.5
c*****-Percentage Reduction in Average Cost that Satisfies the
Consumer Surplus Standard for a Merger Which Reduces the
Number of Firms from n+l to n: Asymmetric Firm Case

L

n

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

1

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

2

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

3

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

4

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

5

.05

.10

.20

.30

.50

The Merger Guidelines (1984, section 3.11) state that if a proposed
merger results in an increase of the industry's Herfindahl-Hirschman

Index

(HHI) of more than 100 and the post-merger HHI substantially exceeds 1800,
"only in extraordinary cases" will mitigating factors prevent the Justice
Department from challenging it.

Recall that the HHI is simply the sum of

the squares

firms' market

shares.

that

in

symmetric

of the individual

five-firm

industry

results

the

A merger
merger

in a

partners

controlling 40% of the industry's assets and the three other firms each
controlling 20% (although the HHI is calculated in terms of market share,
industry assets will be used here as a proxy) results in the HHI rising
from 2000 to 2800.

However, as we see in table 1.4, a net welfare loss

will not result from this merger

if there is a 1. 5% cost reduction,

assuming that the pre-merger markup is 10%.
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And as we can see in table

1.5, this same merger will not result in a price increase if there is a
10% cost reduction.

Whether or not thes~ circumstances constitute an

"extraordinary case" is an empirical question.
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CHAPTER 2
RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY THEORY
AND ANTITRUST POLICY
"It is only because we lack confidence in our
ability to measure elasticities, or perhaps
because we do not think of adopting so explicitly
economic an approach, that we have to define
markets instead." (Posner, 1976, p. 125)

I.

Introduction
Economic

theory

suggests

that a number

of

factors

affect

an

industry's competitive performance. According to the Justice Department's
Merger Guidelines (1984, sections 3.1-3.4), these factors include market
concentration,

ease of entry, product homogeneity,

information about

specific transactions and buyer characteristics, the degree of difference
between

the products

and locations

in the market

and the next-best

substitutes, similarities and differences in the products and locations
of merging firms, ability of small or fringe sellers to increase sales,
and conduct of firms in the market.
concentration

measures,

antitrust

With

analysts

the exception
generally

of market

offer primarily

qualitative descriptions of these.variables and their potential effect on
competitive performance.
or

combining

them

No systematic means of measuring these variables

into

a

quantitative

measure

of

an

industry's

performance, or estimate of prospective change in performance due to a
merger, is generally practiced.
Data and time constraints, due in large part to the structure of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino
rationalizations

antitrust

review

process,

for the current methodology.

are

the

popular

Such arguments seem to

imply that there is an alternative methodology that could be used if the
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constraints were not present; however, no such methodology is generally
recognized.
The

focus

of

much

of

the

empirical

industrial

organization

literature is the attempt to explain the relationship between pricing (or
profits)

and

barriers,

variables

and

demand.

accounting
These

for

market

studies have

concentration,

had

limited

entry

success

at

specifying the relationship between structure and performance, in part due
to the difficulty of accounting for many of the relevant variables, and
in part

due

variables .1
generally

to

the

Further,

are not

inherent

endogeneity

the specifications

derived

form models

of
of

of

many

of

these

the relevant

empirical

industry

models

behavior.

Few

economists would argue that the coefficients on the· market structure
variables estimated in these studies should be used to draw inferences
about the potential effects of specific mergers.
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, 1985, 1988) have introduced a method for
estimating a firm's residual demand elasticity, which is inversely related
to market power.

Residual

demand elasticity

estimation

attempts

to

determine the extent to which market power is being exercised by a firm,
and the extent to which market power can increase because of a merger
between two firms, without completely specifying the relationship between
profitability and all of its numerous interrelated determinants.

Other

studies (e.g., Iwata, 1974. and Lliang. 1987) estimate firms' conjectural
variations.

Conjectural variations,

which can be

thought of as an

implicit component of residual demand elasticities. exclude the important
1For discussions of some of the problems of these empirical studies,
see Waterson (1984, ch , 10), Clarke and Davies (1982), and Phillips
(1976).
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effect of demand elasticity on competitive performance, and the estimation
procedure requires assumptions more restrictive than those required by
residual demand elasticity estimation.
Since

Baker

and

Bresnahan's

papers,

no

further

empirical

applications or discussions of the theory of residual demand elasticity
have appeared in the literature (with the exception of Scheffman and
Spiller's application (1987) that is restricted to the subject of market
definition).

This paper addresses the theory underlying the analytical

method in greater detail than in Baker and Bresnahan's papers, focusing
on the generality of the assumptions required by the method.
Section

II presents

the. model.

Section

III.A

discusses

the

relationship between demand elasticity and the Lerner index, and derives
a generalized version of the relationship.

Section III.B discusses the

relationship between the Lerner index and market power, and evaluates
several

apparent

describes

Baker

residual

demand

discrepancies
and

Bresnahan's

elasticities

in

the

relationship.

approach
using

to

Section

estimating

pre-merger

IV.A

post-merger

residual

demand

elasticities, and generalizes the assumptions necessary for using their
method.

Section IV.B offers an alternative methodology

inferences about post-merger market power.
endogeneity

of

firms'

choices

of

product

for making

Section IV.C discusses the
characteristics

and

the

implications of this endogeneity for interpretation of the results.
Section V describes how residual demand elasticities can be used to derive
the magnitude of efficiency gain that is sufficient to offset the welfare
effects of an estimated increase in market power.
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II. The Hodel
In a generalized. model, the issue of whether to specify price as a
function of quantity, or quantity as a function of price, should be a
matter of notation rather than a matter of behavioral assumptions.

In

this paper, price is stated as a function of quantity, and it should
become clear that the formulation does not necessarily
competitive behavior, such as Cournot.

imply specific

Firm j's inverse demand function

may be written as
(2.1)'

where Qo is a vector of the outputs of the other firms in the industry and
Y is a vector of exogenous demand variables.

The first-order condition

for firm j's profit maximization is
(2.2)
where

dCj(Qj,W,Wj)/dQj is marginal

industry-wide

factor prices,

specific factor prices.

cost, W

is

a vector

and Wj is the vector

of exogenous

of firm j's firm-

Qo is defined implicitly in the system of (n-l)

first-order conditions for firms j-2, ••.n as
(2.3)
Equation (2.3) is the vector of reaction functions of firms 2 through n
to firm l's output.

Substituting (2.3) into (2.1) for firm 1 yields

(2.4)
Equation

(2.4) is firm l's residual demand function, implicit in

which is the behavior of firms 2, •..n.

The endogene ity of Ql in this

specification necessitates a simultaneous-equations estimation technique.
Ordinary least squares estimators are not consistent estimators of the
structural coefficients, because the residual demand equation is a single
22

unidentified
specifying

equation from a simultaneous
the simultaneous

system.

Rather

than fully

system of supply and demand functions, a

limited-information approach such as two-stage least squares can be used.
To identify the parameters of the firm-specific residual demand function
with two-stage least squares, data is required on variables that enter
firm l's supply function but are not correlated with the error term in its
demand equation.

These instruments are regressed on Ql in the first-stage

regression, and the second-stage estimates the residual demand function
where

the

fitted values

of Ql

from

the

first-stage

regression

are

substituted for Ql'
Factor prices that appear in firm l's supply function appear to be
an obvious choice for instruments in this specification.
many

of firm

competitors,

l's factor prices
such industry-wide

residual demand function
Firm-specific

function.
equation

(2.4)

instruments

to

also may be
factor prices

(see equation 2.4)

factor prices

as well as in its supply

cost variables W1 that are not

the

residual

for its

(W) appear in firm l's

are needed for use as instruments.
identify

However, because

demand

included in

In order for the

equation,

significant

variability of W1 that is independent of the variability of Wand
required.

Wo is

This requirement is an obstacle preventing the applicability

of this method in many markets, because in many markets either costs are
highly correlated across firms, or data are not available on the cost
components which might not be highly correlated across firms.2

2For example, as Froeb and Werden (1990, p. 14) note, Scheffman and
Spiller (1987) used regional fuel prices as cost shifters, but these
variables likely would be highly correlated across their sample.

23

Note

that

dPl/dQl from

firm

l's first-order

condition

can be

expressed as
4fl - ill + ill MJo •
dQl
SQl
SQo SQl

(2.5)

converting

(2.5) to an elasticity measure,

(2.6)
which will be denoted
n

el - ell + ~ eljrjl

(2.7)

j-2

where e1 is firm l's inverse residual demand elasticity, ell is firm l's
inverse own-demand elasticity, elj is the inverse cross-demand elasticity
between firm l's price and firm j's output, and rjlis

the elasticity of

firm j's reaction function with respect to firm l's output.

(Reaction

function elasticities are sometimes referred to as conjectural variation
Conjectural

elasticities.)

variations,

estimation process described,

not

recoverable

from

the

are discussed here only to clarify their

role as an implicit characterization of competitive interaction which can
be thought of as a component of residual demand elasticity.
Some

game

oligopolistic
framework

theorists

interaction

(for example,

contend

that

the

cannot be represented
see

Friedman,

1983,

dynamic

process

adequately
pp.

of

in a static

106-7).

Reaction

functions appear to be ambiguous in a single-period model, such as the one
above.

However, a single-period observation of the prices and quantities

determined by a dynamic process must include an implicit characterization
of

the

reaction

conjectural

functions

variations

in the

implicit

in
24

dynamic
the

game being
reaction

played.

functions

can

The
be

considered to be endogenously determined by the information structure of
the industry, the ease of entry, and other factors.
Note that different oligopoly theories can be described in terms of
different values of rJ!. Cournot competition exists between firms i and
j if rji-O, because Cournot competitors assume that their competitors will

not respond to their changes in their output.

Perfect collusion exists

if rji-1, because responding to competitors' output changes proportionally
effectively internalizes monopoly behavior.
if rJi--1, because

attempted

opposite output expansions.

Bertrand competition exists

output restrictions

are met by equal and

Intermediate degrees of competition exist for

values of rJi between -1 and l.
The residual demand function can be estimated in 10g1inear form, so
that the coefficients

on quantities

will be elasticities.

Denoting

xJ-1nXJ,
(2.4')
where

Ul

estimates el'

"Residual demand," as referred to herein. should be distinguished
from a functional

form in which q2'" .qn are explicitly

specified.

If

qZ•.•.qn were explicitly specified in the demand equation, the coefficient
on ql would be an own-demand elasticity, ell' rather than residual demand
elasticity,

el'

The residual demand elasticity

while the own elasticity is a partial derivative.

is a total derivative.
While we find in the

next section that the residual demand elasticity is the relevant variable
for our analysis of competition. much of economic analysis focuses on the
own elasticity.

For example, Chamberlin

(1962, p . 75) refers to the

demand curve as "rigidly defined by the fixity of all products and of all
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other prices."

Expected consumer responses, but not competitor responses,

are implicit in this specification of the demand function.

However, the

actual demand function facing a firm, and thus the marginal revenue that
a firm considers in determining its profit-maximizing price and output,
must incorporate expectations of both competitor and consumer responses.

III. Demand Elasticity, Lerner Indices, and Market Power
A. The Relationship Between Demand Elasticities and the Lerner Index
It is well known that the Lerner index, (p-mc)/p, is an inverse
function of demand elasticity.

The applicability of the relationship has

been perceived to be limited because it usually is derived in the context
of models with restrictive assumptions.
relationship
explained.
demand

often

are

not

The assumptions underlying the

explicitly

acknowledged

or

adequately

In addition, the relationship is derived for various forms of

elasticities:

market

elasticity,

elasticity, own elasticity, etc.
be .derived

in a generalized

homogeneous

products

derivation

and

and

discussion

elasticity,

residual

In this section, the relationship will

form.

Cournot
will

firm

Restrictive
behavior
clarify

are
the

assumptions
not

such as

required.

necessary

The

underlying

assumptions, which will be shown to be less restrictive than recognized
in many articles, including those of Baker and Bresnahan.
From firm l's first-order condition, equation (2.2), we can derive
(2.8)

-

~l

Q1

dQl P1

-

~l.:.£l

P1

equation (2.8) can be expressed as
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n

(2.9) -e1 - - (e11 + l: eljrj1) -

.f1.:.£1

Pi

j-2

the negative

i.e.
to its

inverse

Lerner index.

residual

demand elasticity

The relationship

on any assumptions

about competitive

or costs,

of potential

effects

product

heterogeneity,

or

n firms,

will

specifies
individual
e1 that

competitor;

is

not
it

be necessary

firms,

to

solve

aggregate

Thus the n firms

As will

optimizing

subject

competitors,

to

be
its

and potential
thus

discussed

entrants)

specified,

and

equilibrium

are not necessary
relationship

other

is

Because the relationship

the

implicit

of

notation

l:e1jrj1 for

each

effect

on

of as all

to be substitutes

of

1 is

firm
other

optimizing

that

be

(consumers,

behavior

behavior

and

is not
industry

to hold.

in many different

is usually

assumed to

players'

but

for the relationship

derived

degree

by firm 1 as being potential

behavior,

players'

the

should be thought

below,

expectations

form of demand

Although

definition.

is only their

it does not rely

functional

number of

good and any firms perceived

competitors.

papers.

in that

producing any good which consumers consider

firm l's

This

behavior,3

entry,

market

i.e.

of interest.

competitors
for

it

is general

of a firm is equal

derived

contexts

in many

in the context

of a

3Note that the. above derivation
does not assume Cournot behavior,
because dP1/dQi is a total derivative,
not a partial
derivative.
Defining
quantity as a function of price and differentiating
with respect to price
yields the identical
result:

(2.1')
(2.2')

Qj

+ PjgQj - dCj gQj
dPj

dQj dPj

If the residual
demand function
is monotonic in (Pj,Qj)-space,
then
dPj(.)/dQj-l/dQj(.)/dPj.
Dividing (2.2') by dQj/dPj yields equation (2.2),
and thus also equation (2.8).
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z~----

model with

restrictive

assumptions,

relationship usually is overlooked.
sometimes

unstated)

relationship

assumptions

the general applicability

of the

Examples of the restrictive (though

underlying

various

versions

of

the

include dominant firm (Landes and Posner, 1981, pp. 944-5;

Ordover, Sykes, and Willig, 1982, p. 1861), monopoly (Tirole, 1988, p. 66,
70, 137; Clarke and Davies, 1982, p. 279, and Posner, 1976, p. 246),
homogeneous

goods (Appelbaum, 1982, p. 290; Iwata, 1974, p. 947), and

Cournot (Landes and Posner, 1981, p. 984).
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, pp. 12-14; 1988, pp. 289-90) list several
sets of assumptions
These

assumptions

that are sufficient for the relationship
are dominant

perfect competition,

firm behavior,

Stackelberg

to hold.
behavior,

(1.e.

the "limit case of product differentiation"

monopoly), and consistent conjectures equilibrium.

The most general of

these assumptions is that of consistent conjectures equilibrium; however,
even this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive.

Neither equilibrium

nor consistent conjectures are necessary for the relationship to hold.
Note that the relationship is derived, not from industry equilibrium
conditions, but from firm l's profit-maximizing

first-order

condition.

The relationship thus requires only that firm 1 is maximizing its profits
given its expectation about competitor and consumer responses, but does
not place any constraints on competitor and consUmer behavior, not even
profit-maximizing

by firm l's competitors or industry equilibrium.

A type of "rational expectations" assumption about competitor and
consumer

responses

assumption
assumption.

does underlie

the relationship,

is less restrictive than Bresnahan's
Because

firm

1 maximizes
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profits

but

the necessary

consistent conjectures
with

respect

to its

expectation of consumer and competitor behavior, the demand elasticity in
its first-order

condition

is an expected value, and thus equation

(2.9)

could be written as
n

(2.9')

-E1(e1) - -E1(ell + l: e1jrj1) - .f1.:£.1,
P1

j-2

i.e. firm l's Lerner index equals firm l's expectation
demand elasticity, where El is firm l's expectation
Bresnahan

(1988), consistent with Bresnahan's

of its residual

operator.

Baker and

(1981) model, assume that

firms know the parameter values elj. j-l •..•n. and express equation (2.9)
(see their equation 11) as

each

of

its competitors'

conjectural

j-2 •...n).

variations

l:rj1 does

Bresnahan's

consistent

conjecture

E1(rjl) - rjl.

(.1.e.

not

assumption.

satisfy

Baker

and

Knowledge

of

each

individual firm's rjl is needed. because each rjl interacts with each elj
separately.
Thus. in addition to the unnecessary

assumption

that the industry

be in equilibrium. Baker and Bresnahan's consistent conjectures assumption
requires

that

firm

rational expectations
However.

it probably

1 knows

the n parameters

elj' j-l, •••n , and has

about each of the (n-1) parameters
is

very

difficult

for

firms

rj1' j-2 •...n.

to make

informed

inferences about partial derivatives based on the data that is observable
to the firm.

Firm 1 changes .its price. and observes
29

a change in its

output.
which

Firm 1 likely has very limited information about the extent to

its· output change

derivatives.

is influenced by eech of the (Zn-L)

Rather, market behavior

enables

partial

firm 1 to observe

its

residual demand elasticity, el. If firm 1 has no information about any of
the (2n-1) partial derivatives, but has rational expectations

about el'

i.e. E1(el)-el' then the residual demand elasticity predicts the Lerner
index without b Las ."

Thus E1(e1)-e1, and profit-maximizing behavior on the

part of firm I, are sufficient to support the inverse relationship between
firm l's residual demand elasticity and its Lerner index.
Rational expectations
rational expectations

about demand elasticity do not necessitate

about competitor behavior, either as an aggregate

or for individual competitors.

One might argue that rational expectations

about competitor behavior may lead to perfect collusion, because pricecutting could be easily detected and punished.

But firms' observations

of their residual demand elasticities contain a noisy signal of their
competitors'

behavior,

cross-elasticities,

confounded by the effects of own-elasticities,

and exogenous parameters.

The degree

to which

a

firm's behavior is hidden in the noisy signal received by its competitors
may significantly affect firms' conjectural variations and thus the degree
to which supracompetitive pricing can be maintained.
Next, an apparent
index relationship

indeterminacy

will be refuted.

in the demand elasticity-Lerner
The inverse relationship

between

market power and a firm's demand elasticity may appear to conflict with

4Past observations of e1 may provide imperfect information about its
current value. Firm I, of course, can incorporate information in addition
to observations of past values of e1' in estimating the current el. No
source of bias in firm l's estimation of e1 is apparent.
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the fact that on certain demand functions (such as linear), there is a
Thus it may

direct relationship between price and demand elasticity.

appear to be ambiguous whether a firm facing elastic demand is in a
competitive industry or has significant market power and has raised its
price into the elastic range of its demand curve.

The apparent ambiguity

is due to a confusion between the relationship between price and demand
elasticity,

and the relationship

between

profit-maximizin&

price

and

demand elasticity.
Although a price increase in some cases may leave a firm at a more
elastic point on its demand curve, a price increase that results in a move
to a more elastic point on a given residual demand function will reduce
a firm's profits.

A firm will choose the price that maximizes its profits

on a given residual demand function, and (assuming no change in marginal
cost), will raise that price only if its residual demand becomes more

(from equation 2.9), regardless of the functional form of demand,
(2.10)

del

dPl
This

relationship

may

appear

ambiguous

in part

because

confusion between market and firm-specific demand elasticity.

of

a

Consider

a merger that increases firms' market power, 1.. e. reduces the firms'
demand elasticities and thus enables them to raise price.
demand curve (1..e.

The market

the demand curve facing a hypothetical monopolist) does

not shift due to a change in competition among the firms in that market.
The post-merger price is higher than the pre-merger price on the same
market demand function, and thus the market demand elasticity may be
higher

post-merger.

Accordingly,

the merger
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results

in firm demand

elasticity falling and market demand elasticity rising.
counterintuitive

result

has

resulted

in

some

This somewhat

confusion

relationship between demand elasticity and market power.

about

the

But the inverse

relationship between the Lerner index and a firm's demand elasticity is
not made indeterminate by the fact that demand curves may have a direct
relationship between price and demand elasticity.
Of course. estimations of demand elasticities appear throughout the
literature.

However. the specifications of the models generally are not

residual demand functions, and thus yield demand elasticities from which
market power inferences should not be made.

If. for example. rather than

specifying a residual demand function. Pl-Pl(Ql'Y.W). we more fully specify
the demand function as P1-P1(Ql.QZ•...Qn.Y.W). the coefficient on Ql will
have an ambiguous relationship with firm l's Lerner index.

In addition.

the inclusion of structural variables such as entry barriers and market
concentration

implies that the coefficient on Ql will have an ambiguous

relationship with firm l's Lerner index.

B. The Relationship Between the Lerner Index and Market Power
The

previous

conditions.

subsection

a firm's Lerner

residual demand elasticity.
observations

establishes

index

is equal

that

under

very

general

to its negative

inverse

In order to make market power inferences from

of residual demand elasticities.

it also is important to

understand the relationship between the Lerner index and market power.
The Lerner index. (p-mc)/p. is an index of market power because it
directly reflects the allocative inefficiency due to the divergence of
price from marginal cost that results from the exercise of market power.
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Because market power often is defined as the ability to charge a price
greater than marginal cost, in this respect the Lerner index appears to
be an accurate index of the degree of market power.

However, the Lerner

index has been criticized by some authors (e.g., Clarkson and Miller,
Several actual and

1982, p. 60, Landes and Posner, 1981, p. 941).
perceived

problems

with

Lerner

indices,

and

the

implications

for

applications of residual demand elasticity analysis, are discussed below.
While the Lerner index reflects the "degree" of market power being
exercised, this degree is only one dimension of the welfare loss due to
the exercise of market power.
may have very

different

degrees

difference in output levels. 5
calculation

of welfare

Two industries with the same Lerner index
of welfare

loss due

in part

to a

The Lerner index is a component of the

loss, but additional

information

is required.

However, for many policy purposes, an estimate of the total welfare loss
is not necessary.
index

An estimate of a Lerner index or a change in a Lerner

is sufficient

decisions.

information

to make

many

antitrust

enforcement

One application that might appear to require more information

about welfare losses than a Lerner index, but does not, is determining
the degree of efficiency required to negate an estimated increase in a
Lerner index (see section V below).
Second, if marginal costs are an increasing function of output, the
current marginal cost is less than the marginal cost that would exist if
there were a procompetitive output expansion.

In this case, the Lerner

SThe relevant output dimension of deadweight welfare loss actually is
not the output produced, but rather the difference between the output
.produced and the output that would be produced if price equalled marginal
cost.
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index overstates the degree to which prices exceed the level of marginal
cost that would exist in the hypothetical perfectly competitive state.!
Third,

comparing

"markups"

based

industries may show large variations

on

accounting

data

across

that appear to be attributable

factors other than differences in competitive performance.

to

This may imply

that the markups are not appropriately estimated Lerner indices, rather
than that there is an inherent problem with Lerner indices as an index of
market power.
important

Comparisons of accounting-data-based

industry

cost differences

in areas

markups may overlook

such

as marketing

and

research and development, as well as differences in the opportunity costs
of some resources
apparently

high

(see Clarkson, 1977).
markups

in

breakfast

This issue is illustrated by
cereals

and

pharmaceuticals,

industries in which marketing and R&D are relatively high.

As discussed

in Klein

earnings

and

Lefler

(1981) and

Shapiro

(1983),

firms'

on

investments in such intangible assets is not inconsistent with competitive
performance.
A fourth problem arises due to the fact that Lerner indices are
inversely

related

to marginal

anticompetitive behavior.

costs, as well

as directly

related

The inverse relationship between Land

to

c can

be seen by
- p

c~

5ll. - _.:::,dc:...,__
~ 0, since c ~ P and Qf ~ 1
dc

p2

dc

(Of course dL/dc-O in perfect competition, where c-p and dP/dc-l).

In

other words, efficiency, rather than market power, may be responsible for
a high Lerner index (e.g.,

see Demsetz 1973). Alternative cost structures

6This argument is discussed in Landes and Posner (1981), p. 941.
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for an industry could result in the alternative with the higher price
being the alternative with the lower Lerner index.
that a firm's
efficiency

relatively

high

Lerner

index

However, the argument

is due to its relative

implies that the efficiency this firm has achieved is not

available to other firms, because otherwise competition would dissipate
the profits from the efficiency.

In effect, the firm's exclusive access

to the efficiency is a source of market power; however, it is socially
beneficial market power relative to the alternative absence of this unique
efficiency.

To the extent that an individual firm's efficiency advantage

relative to competitors can persist in the long run, this criticism of
Lerner indices is valid.

Indeed, we should be especially careful not to

mislabel firms with differential efficiencies as anticompetitive.
Fifth,

the Lerner

index reflects

the divergence

of· price

from

marginal cost, not just due to anticompetitive behavior, but also due to
product differentiation.
prices

can

variations

exceed

their

If products are imperfect substitutes, firms'
marginal

costs

even

if

their

are perfectly competitive (see equation 2.7).

conjectural
It might be

argued that antitrust policy should focus on anticompetitive

conduct,

rather than on the divergence of price from marginal cost due to other
factors such as product differentiation.
However, as can be seen in equation (2.7), the degree of product
differentiation, as measured by cross-elasticities of demand, interacts
with firms' conjectural variations to determine competitive performance.
If two merging firms have very low cross-elasticities, a change in their
conjectural variations from competitive to collusive will have relatively
little

effect

on

their

Lerner

indices.
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Because

antitrust

policy

presumably

is intended

to

degree

substitution

and

of

In addition,

product

exogenous, but rather
example,

the

generally

is one that

Firms

most

presumably

limits

(e.g.,

this

both

the

conj ecture

are

easily

leaders

from a number of sources.
of ambiguity

are

process.

between a firm's

product

1977).

and Visscher,
in

their

cannot

products,

choices

even in theory.

insulating

In

case,

similar

be placed

above, we must be careful
them as anticompetitive.

on Lerner

undergoing rapid

indices

from
with
to

the

to avoid
Thus,

as measures

of

innovation.

of Lerner indices

is subject

For some types of interpretation,
relatively

Of

firms

industries

latter

of

be completely

from

the

For

8

space

distinguished

by labeling

Thus, the interpretation

may not be

characteristic

factor

barriers

case discussed

market power in industries

product

see Prescott

structural

be

should

in

"competitiveness"

innovations.

innovative

of the competitive

among firms'

with

efficiency

in some instances

important

Thus,

may not

skepticism

sources

performance,

competitive

the substitutability

consider

product

differential

point

products

industries

beneficial

greater

profitable

from substitution

competition

punishing

of

differentiation

characteristics.

separated
course,

degree

determined as part

competitors'

product

the

competitive

to the analysis.7

important

and its

influence

inconsequential.

to ambiguity
some of the

For example,

in

7The importance of the degree of consumer substitution
is recognized
in the Merger Guidelines in sections
3.412, "The Degree of Difference
Between the Products and Locations
in the Market and the Next-Best
Substitutes,"
and 3.413, "Similarities
and Differences in the Products and
Locations of the Merging Firms." No quantitative
method of evaluating the
competitive significance
of these variables
is suggested.
SA further discussion of the implications of the endogene1ty of firms'
choices of product attributes
is in section IV.C below.
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comparing Lerner indices across equal-sized geographic markets in the same
industry, it often may be safe to assume that certain cost characteristics
are the same across markets.
A Lerner index change brought about by a merger, as opposed to the
level of the Lerner
ambiguity

index, is not subject to most of the sources of

discussed.

Assuming

no efficiency

gains due to the merger

(efficiency gains will be considered in section V), and assuming no shift
in exogenous factors, such as market demand, an increase in the Lerner
index must result from an increase in market power.

For the purpose of

antitrust analysis of a merger, it 1s the change, not the level, of market
power that is relevant.

Section IV describes how post-merger changes in

Lerner indices can be predicted using residual demand elasticities.

IV. Post-Merger Residual Demand Elasticity Inferences
A. The Baker and Bresnahan Method
While inferring the current degree of market power from estimated
residual demand elasticities

is a useful exercise, it is the change in

market power resulting from a merger that is important for the antitrust
analysis of mergers.

Baker and Bresnahan suggest a method of making such

inferences, however their method raises some difficult issues which they
do not discuss.

This section analyzes their method and finds theoretical

support for their assumptions under certain industry conditions.
B suggests

an alternative

Section C discusses

method

the possible

product characteristics

for making
implications

post-merger
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inferences.

of endogenous

on our ability to make post-merger

Section

choice of

inferences.

Yhile the ordinary demand curve of a group of consumers

is the

simple horizontal summation of the consumers' individual demand curves,
the residual demand curve that would face a group of firms if they were
to merge is not the simple horizontal summation of their residual demand
curves.

For example, consider a market with impenetrable entry barriers

and two competitors.
result

in highly

Competitive interaction between the two firms may

elastic

residual

demand

for both

firms,

and

the

horizontal sum of their demand curves also may be highly elastic, although
they would

face

relatively

inelastic

demand

if

they

merged.

The

difficulty in making inferences about post-merger demand elasticities from
pre-merger

data is in determining

the independent effect on residual

demand elasticities due to competitive interaction between the two merging
firms, as opposed to the effects of competition from other sources and the
effect of consumer demand elasticity.
Suppose that firms 1 and 2 propose to merge.

Firm l's pre-merger

inverse demand function may be written as

(2.11)
where Q_ is the output of non-merging

firms.

Firm l's first-order

condition for profit maximization is
(2.12)

Pl(Ql.Qz,Q_.Y)

+ QldPl
dQl

Q_

-

Q.Ql!.Ql'Y'Y1)
dQl

is defined implicitly in the system of first-order conditions for firms

j-3 •... n as

(2.13)
Substituting (2.13) into (2.11) yields
(2.14)
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Equation

(2.14)

is

firm

l's

"partial"

residual

demand

function.

Estimation of partial residual demand functions yields partial residual
demand elasticities, which will be denoted with a p in their subscripts,
as

(2.15) ellp

£211
dq1 dqZ-O
n

- ell + ~ e1jrj1
j-3
Note that the difference between (2.7) and (2.15) is that in (2.15)
the summation begins at j-3.

(2.16) elZp -

£211

Similarly, e1Zp can be expressed as
n

- £121 + ~ £121 19.j

dqz dql-O

c5
qz j-3 s qj s qz
n

- e12 + ~ eljrjZ
j-3
The partial residual demand function can be estimated in loglinear
form,

so that

the coefficients

on quantities

will

be

elasticities.

(2.17)
where O'ijestimates eijp.
Baker and Bresnahan's method for making post-merger
based

on an assumption

proportionally

that the two firms will

post-merger,

i. e. that c5qd6qz-1.

adjust

inferences 1s
their output

If the proportional

post-merger output adjustment assumption is met, a one percent decrease
Thus
post-merger residual demand elasticity is ellP+elZp.
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firm

l's

estimated

The Lerner index-residual demand elasticity relationship derived in
section III.A implies that a given increase in an inverse residual demand
elasticity will result in that same magnitude of increase in the Lerner
index.

Firm l's post-merger Lerner index should be -(ellp+e12p)and the

estimated increase in the Lerner index for firm 1 is el-ellp-e12p' The
implied

percentage

proportional

price

increase

is

(el-ellP-e12p)/(1+eup+e12p)' The

output adjustment assumption is a convenient mathematical

device that enables us to make post-merger market power inferences.

The

assumption may be reasonable under certain circumstances but does not
appear

to apply generally.

Baker and Bresnahan

do not examine the

assumption.
The proportional

output adjustment assumption,

6Qd6q2-1,

can be

interpreted as a unitary conjectural variation between the two firms.

A

unitary conjectural variation is the equilibrium result of collusion or
merger in simple oligopoly models (e.g., Cubbin, 1983, Waterson, 1984),
and thus may be a reasonable assumption.

Indeed, it makes intuitive sense

that colluding firms will change their outputs proportionally,
proportional responses imply coordinated behavior.
Forbes (1988), collusion implies 6qd6q2-l

because

However, as noted by

only if there is "symmetry"

between the two firms, which is characterized by 6~1/SP2-S~2/SP1' where
denotes firm i's profits.

~i

However, Forbes does not address the market

characteristics that will yield this symmetry.
At

the

extreme,

if

the merging

firms'

products

are

perfect

substitutes, and if the two firms face the same constant marginal cost,
it is economically irrelevant how they distribute their output between
them.

If, alternatively, the firms' products are perfect substitutes and
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the firms face the same increasing cost function, the firms will produce
the same outputs pre-merger, and will adjust their output proportionally
post-merger in order to minimize the cost of producing any given output.
Thus in either case, the proportional output adjustment assumption holds.
Product

differentiation

complicates

the

issue,

however

the

proportional output adjustment assumption is reasonable in markets with
certain forms of product differentiation.
dimensional product differentiation.

Consider a model of one-

If demand is uniformly distributed,

and if firms have the same cost functions and are located at uniform
intervals, the products of any two' firms (not just adjacent firms) will
be symmetrically differentiated, in the sense of the Forbes definition
above.

Symmetric distribution of competitors, though it may seem to be

a stringent assumption, is an equilibrium outcome in models of product
differentiation when firms choose their product characteristics
Prescott and Visscher, 1977).
uniform

demand,

firms

will

(e.g.•

Of course. we should expect that, given
choose

locations

that

limit

the

substitutability between their product and their competitors' products.
Though

this

simple

one-dimensional

product

differentiation

model

is

intuitive, its assumptions, such as uniform demand', are not necessarily
required for symmetric product differentiation to exist.
Assume that two firms face the same constant marginal cost and the
following symmetric linear demand functions:
(2.18)

PI

a + bQI + CQ2

(2.19)

P2

a + bQ2 + cQI .

Solving the model for the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium outputs
of

the

two

firms.

we

find

that
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the

two

firms'

outputs

change

proportionally.

Thus

equivalent

demand

elasticities

elasticities yield proportional output adjustments.
adjustments may occur more generally.

and

cross-

Proportional output

However, in more complex models,

if we set the proportional output changes of the two firms equal, and
solve for the conditions

necessary

to support

the relationship,

the

conditions do not have intuitive interpretations.9
B. An Alternative Method
An alternative method for making inferences of post-merger demand
elasticities from pre-merger data is based on a simple approach that is
sometimes used in calculating "market" demand elasticities.

The market

demand elasticity is the demand elasticity that would face a hypothetical
monopolist

in a particular product and geographic market.

An approach

that has been used to calculate market demand elasticities is to simply
sum the sales of the firms in the market

and calculate

the demand

elasticity of this quantity with respect to the average market price.
Note that this simple method differs from a horizontal summation of the
firms' demand curves in that consumer switching among firms within the
market definition due to changes in relative prices is internalized, i.e.
such

switching

does

not

affect

the

calculated

demand

elasticity.

Internalizing inter-firm switching is the fundamental difference between
market demand elasticities and firm-level demand elasticities.

9For example, if we generalize the above model to
(2.18') P1 - a + bQl + cQ2
(2.19') P2 - e + fQ2 + gQl
and allow the two firms to face different marginal costs, d and h.
respectively, set (Ql'-Ql)/Ql-(Q2'-Q2)/Q2'and solve, we get
(g2+2fcr21)(hd-ha-ed+ea) + cr21(2ehg-e2g-h2g+2ceh-ce2-ch2) (c2+2bgr12)(hd-ha-ed+ea) + gr12(2adc-a2c-d2c+2gad-ga2-gd2).
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This same method could be used to calculate the "market" demand
elasticity based on a market definition that includes only th~ two merging
firms. as opposed to the market defined by other means such as that
described in the Merger Guidelines.

This method internalizes consumers'

switching between the two firms' goods, and thus yields an estimate of the
post-merger demand elasticity that the merged firm would face.10
Scheffman

and

Spiller

(1987) use

residual

demand

analysis

to

estimate "market" demand elasticities based on quantities that are the sum
of the sales of the firms in the market.

They refer to their estimates

of demand elasticities as the "potential market power" of the group of
firms in the market.
They apply

the method

to a homogeneous

industry, and the method appears reasonable in this context.
curve

that would

homogeneous

face a hypothetical

product

can be

combination

represented

The demand

of producers

in two-space,

good

while

of a'

product

differentiation implies that market demand curves may not be well defined
in two dimensions.
However,

we should not necessarily

differentiated product contexts.
with respect

dismiss

the method

in all

Symmetry between firms, discussed above

to Baker and Bresnahan's method

for making post-merger

inferences, also should satisfy this approach.
If the average of two
firms' prices yields the same total sales regardless of the distribution
of prices across firms, 1.e. if there is a unique mapping from average

lOA simple two-period example with two firms illustrates this point.
In the first period, Pl-lO, Ql-8, P2-8, Q2-10. In the second period, firm
1 increases its price, and firm l's sales fall, in part because some
consumers switch to firm 2: Pl-ll, Ql-6, P2-8, Q2-11. Firm l's demand
elasticity is four, and the demand elasticity of the combined firm,
calculated using the two firms' average price and total quantity. is one.
43

price

to total quantity,

defined.

This

unique

then the market
mapping

need

not

demand

elasticity

exist

for

all

is well

possible

distributions of prices that constitute a given average price, but only
for those combinations of prices that are observed in the sample.

Indeed,

it may be true that under fairly general conditions the average of two
competitors' prices that we observe in equilibrium will yield the same
total output sold by the two firms.
Given a homogeneous good or a unique mapping from average price to
total quantity, this method will yield a demand elasticity that is on the
market

demand

curve, because

the sum of the outputs

of a group of

producers sold at a given price must be the output that they could sell
at the same price if they acted in concert; however, the elasticity may
be on a different point on the demand curve than the monopolist's profitmaximizing price.

Thus the estimated market demand elasticity may not be

the equilibrium demand elasticity for the hypothetical monopolist.
This alternative method of inferring post-merger market power has
not been rigorously demonstrated to be superior to Baker and Bresnahan's
method, but it has intuitive support and can be estimated with very little
marginal effort.
intuitive

Thus the method, at the very least, provides a promising

alternative.

In

chapter

3,

post-merger

residual

demand

elasticities will be estimated using Baker and Bresnahan's method and the
alternative method just proposed.

In addition, market demand elasticities

will be estimated using average price and total market quantity.

Because

the market demand elasticity is the demand elasticity that would face the
hypothetical monopolist, it provides a reference point to determine the
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Competing retail chains may merge and close or relocate some of their
stores.
which

Similarly, two airlines may merge and redistribute the times at

they schedule flights, and perhaps

also reduce the number of

flights, on routes on which they previously competed.
As many models of product differentiation illustrate, the further
is a customer's optimal product choice from the closest available choice
(in product-characteristic
greater

is

the

redistributing

"travel"

space, geographic space, or time space), the
cost

and reducing product

unambiguous effect on welfare.
changes

in

that

the

products

must

be

incurred.

characteristics

However,

may not have an

Both demand and costs may be affected by

offered

by

producers.

Though

additional

differentiated products add to consumer welfare, fixed cost per product
implies that total surplus does not rise unambiguously as the number of
differentiated

products

increases.

As

Spence

(1976)

shows,

the

equilibrium level of product diversity provided by multiproduct firms may
be either greater or less than the social optimum, depending on own- and
cross-elasticities of demand and the level of fixed costs.

Competition

can generate too much product diversity because the fixed cost of an
additional product offering may more than offset the incremental consumer
benefits, although the firm's incentive to introduce the product may still
exist because some consumer surplus is transferred from one firm to
another.

As Spence shows, the incentive to provide the optimal product

mix is dependent on the fraction of net surplus from an incremental
product introduction that a firm can capture (p. 410).

Yhile Spence does

not address how the degree of competition affects this incentive (he uses
a monopolistic competition model), clearly the externality described is
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internalized as competition falls.

Of course the net effect on consumer

welfare is unclear.
In addition, a reduction in product

offerings may involve other

sources of efficiency gains important to a welfare analysis of a merger.
For example, an airline merger may result in fewer flights offered per day
on a given

route, but; the airline may be able to use

larger, more

efficient aircraft and/or fly at a higher rate of capacity than in the
pre-merger

state

(perhaps because

competition

resulted

in both

firms

offering flights during certain periods in which demand was not sufficient
to fill two larger aircraft).

Thus, although the method of making post-

merger inferences discussed in sections A and B focuses on price effects
of horizontal mergers under conditions that are relatively general, other
sources of consumer welfare loss and efficiencies are possible; a full
welfare analysis of the effects of a merger should include consideration
of all such effects.

Unfortunately, the magnitudes of many market power

and efficiency effects are difficult to estimate.11

V. Efficiency Gains
As discussed in chapter I, an efficiency gain may be sufficiently
large to negate the welfare loss caused by the increased market power
created

by

the merger.

"Sufficiently

large"

might

be

defined

as

sufficient to offset the deadweight loss due to the price increase (the
Williamson standard) or as sufficient to deter the merger partners from
raising price above the pre-merger level (the consumer surplus standard).

llSee discussion of Morrison and Winston (1987) in chapter 3, section
III,

infra.
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Determining the magnitude of efficiency gain that would satisfy the
consumer welfare criterion might seem to be a formidable task; but given
estimates of residual demand elasticities, the critical level of reduction
in marginal cost can be easily derived.

From equation (2.9), solve for

firm l's price,
(2.20)
Assuming

proportional

post-merger

changes

in Ql and Q2 as before,

the

post-merger price of firm 1 is
(2.21)
where prime subscripts denote post-merger values.
in no loss of consumer surplus if Pl'-Pl•

The merger will result

Thus, setting (2.20) equal to

(2.21) and solving for cl' yields
(2.22)
Thus Cl'· is the post-merger

marginal cost that is sufficiently

low to

keep firm 1'5 price from rising due to the additional market power created
by the merger.

The percentage

reduction

in marginal

cost implied by

(2.22) is
(2.23)

-

~1~l1p.:jh2p

l+el
Thus the percentage reduction in marginal cost that would fulfill
the consumer surplus standard

(1.e. Pl'-Pl) can be calculated

from the

residual demand elasticities without imposing any additional assumptions
or requiring any additional data.
is applied to the USAir-Piedmont

In chapter 3, section V.D, this method
merger.
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CHAPTER 3
THE USAIR-PIEDMONT MERGER:
AN ESTIMATION OF RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITIES
" ••.

we might have challenged USAir-Piedmont."12

I. Introduction
While many consider the Department of Transportation's permissive
antitrust stance toward airline industry mergers in the 1980s to have
resulted

in significant

reductions

in competition.

the case against

airline mergers has not been strongly supported by empirical studies.
More

generally.

empirical

methods have had very

limited

success

at

answering many important questions about competition and antitrust policy.
The necessity for policymakers to predict changes in competition due to
a merger ex ante provides a particularly difficult empirical problem.
Residual demand elasticity analysis, discussed in detail in chapter 2, is
used in this chapter to address the competitive implications of the USAirPiedmont merger on five routes on which they competed before the merger.
Those

routes are Baltimore-Tampa,

Washington-Norfolk,

Memphis-Nashville. and Baltimore-Orlando.

Boston-Norfolk,

Pre-merger time-series data are

used to estimate the pre-merger and post-merger degrees of market power
for each of the routes.
Section II is a brief discussion of airline industry competition and
policy issues.

Section III is a discussion of alternative empirical

techniques that can be used to address airline competition.

Section IV

describes

Section

the

data

and

discusses

specification

issues.

V

12Char1es Rule. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Department
of Justice, quoted in Air Transport World. February. 1989. p. 36.
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describes the USAir-Piedmont merger and presents the empirical results for
the five l:outes.

II. Airline Industry Competition and Mergers
Recent mergers and increases in fares have raised concern among many
about competition

1n the airline

industry. 13

Some economists

(e.g.,

Levine [1987] and Borenstein [1989]) argue that structural characteristics
resulting

in anticompetitive

scarcity of landing

performance

in the

industry

slots and gates, "fortress" hubs,

include

a

frequent-flyer

programs, airline-owned computer reservation services, and travel agent
commission incentives.
as

having

structural

However, the airline industry sometimes is cited
characteristics

conducive

particularly capital that is highly mobile.

to

contestabi11ty,

Bailey and Panzar (1981, p.

125) argue that "this theory [contestabi1ity] is particularly relevant to
city-pair airline markets."
Antitrust

policy

in the industry in the 1980s appears

followed this latter view.
twenty

largest

airline

to have

Table 3.1 below lists chronologically
mergers

approved

by

the

Department

the
of

Transportation (DOT) between May, 1985, and October, 1987.

13Competitive concerns have been expressed by the press, (e.g., ~
Street Journal, July 19, 1989), by airline industry publications (e.g.,
Air Transport World, December, 1988), and by some economists (e.g., Kahn,
1988).
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Table 3.1: Recent DOT-Approved Airline Mergers

lill

USAir - Pennsylvania Commuter Airlines
Midway - Air Florida
Southwest - Muse
People Express - Frontier
United - Pan Am's Pacific Division

.liM

Piedmont - Empire
Horizon - Cascade
People Express - Britt
Northwest - Republic
Presidential - Key
Texas Air - Eastern
Alaska Air - Jet America
NA - Ozark
Texas Air - People Express
Delta - Western
Alaska Air - Horizon

l2ll

USAir - Pacific Southwest
American - Air California
USAir - Piedmont
Braniff - Florida Express

There has been significant disagreement
agencies responsible

for antitrust

between

enforcement

the two federal

in the industry.

The

Department of Justice (DOJ) played an antitrust advisory role to the DOT
until 1989, when antitrust jurisdiction was transferred from DOT to DOJ.
Before

the transfer

of jurisdiction,

DOJ

recommended

opposing

three

mergers that were ultimately approved by the DOT (Northwest-Republic, TWAOzark, and United's purchase of Pan Am's Pacific Division).
In the USAir-Piedmont
possible

anticompetitive

case,

problems,

the DOJ
but

without an official recommendation.

filed

comments

later withdrew

from

the case

An industry publication

reported,

"when asked why Justice did not oppose the USAir-Piedmont
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suggesting

merger . . .

Charles

Rule

rejected. ,1114

told ~,

'[Our arguments

on]

the

three

others

were

An administrati·!e law judge recommended disapproval of the

USAir-Piedmont deal (US DOT, 1987), but the DOT ultimately approved it.
More recently, the Justice Department challenged Eastern's sale of
Philadelphia gate space to USAir and the merger of American and Delta's
computer reservation systems.

Some interpret these actions as signals

that the tide has turned in airline industry antitrust enforcement, and
that future airline mergers are unlikely to meet with federal government
approval.

It appears that in spite of the volume of industry research,

there is not strong empirical support either for the past relatively lax
antitrust enforcement or for the present apparently stricter enforcement.
Because airline data is relatively abundant,
empirical

results may be primarily

the lack of applicable

due to limitations

in empirical

techniques.

III. Empirical Approaches to Analysis of Airline Competition
The airline

industry has been

structure-performance
fares

on

measures

competition,

dummy

studies.1S
of

market

variables

the subject of numerous

These cross-section
concentration,
for

studies regress

measures

slot-constrained

recent

of

potential

airports,

dummy

variables for hubs, measures of leisure vs. business travel, mileage, load
factors, and numerous other variables.

Some of these studies (e.g.,

14Air Transport World, February, 1989, p. 36.
lSRecent papers include Brown and Warren-Boulton (1988), Borenstein
(1988), Ayres (1988), Hurdle, et 81. (1988), Morrison and Winston (1987,
1988), Butler and Huston (1987), Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985), and
Call and Keeler (1985).
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Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1985) characterize their approaches as tests
of

the

contestabllity

contestabi1ity

hypothesis.

generally

is

The

rejected

hypothesis

because

the

structural variables are significant and positive.

of

perfect

coefficients

on

These studies are

unanimous in their conclusion that "structure matters."
Morrison and Winston's results (1988) indicate that for routes with
three or more carriers, a loss of one competitor increases average fares
by

about $6

competitors

(less than one cent per mile).
to

one

increases

fares by

$89

A reduction
(nine cents

from two

per

mile),

indicating a much more pronounced effect on fares of a second competitor
than of a third, fourth, etc. (and also indicating potential problems with
linearity assumptions in the specification of structural variables in many
of these studies).
Some of these studies have introduced an interesting innovation to
structure-performance
competition.
relatively

analysis

Measures

of

straightforward

by

including

the degree

measures

of potential

in this industry because

of

potential

competition

are

the presence

of

airlines operating out of one or both of the endpoints of a route suggests
that they may be best able to respond quickly to attempted anticompetitive
behavior

on

that

route.

Evidence

that

the presence

of

potential

competitors affects pricing is suggestive of a degree of contestability,
but the contestability is imperfect if the current number of competitors
also affects pricing.

Morrison and Winston found that each potential

entrant (defined as a carrier with operations at both endpoints) reduces
average fares by $2.56 (one-fourth of one cent per mile).
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Variations

on

this

potential

entry

specification

include

the

treatment of Hurdle (1988), who considers the d!fferential effects of
potential entrants based on ease of entry into alternative types of
airports.

Hurdle finds that the effect of potential entry on yields

differs according to whether or not an entrant can achieve scale economies
at a given airport (1. e. whether the airport is small enough to be a
natural monopoly) and whether or not incumbents have developed scope
economies via hub-and-spoke systems at that airport.
Dummy

variables

coefficients.

for

hub

airports

generally

have

positive

This result is consistent with the hypothesis that hubs

somehow enable firms to maintain anticompetitive prices.

One theory of

how hubs may facilitate anticompetitive pricing is that a carrier with
numerous flights to and from a hub is in a relatively strong position to
use predatory actions toward firms attempting to undercut the hubbing
firm's prices on individual flights to and from the hub (Levine, 1987, p.
445).

But a significant source of efficiency from hubbing is that it

permits frequent service to routes that are so thinly traveled that they
could

not

support

such

service

otherwise

(Levine,

1987,

p.

441).

Increased load factors on these thin routes result in lower unit costs.
But the positive coefficients on hub dummies suggest that the former
effect may outweigh the latter.
Borenstein (1989) argues that hubs constitute entry barriers in that
they foreclose input markets (e.g.,
airport).

the market for gates at a given

He estimates cross-section equations for individual firms

rather than aggregating across firms as most of the other studies do. He
includes an airline's share of total enplanements at the endpoints and
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finds that the coefficient is significant and positive.

This estimated

effect of airport share is independent of the effect of route share.
The coefficients on dummies for slot-constrained airports in these
studies are significant and positive.

Morrison and Winston (1988) use

four slot dummies. one for each of the four slot-constrained airports.18
and the fact that the coefficients differ from one other by as much as a
factor

of

eight

suggests

that

this

specification

a

is

significant

improvement over other studies' use of only one slot dummy.
One of the numerous innovations of Morrison and Winston's study is
that it makes inferences about post-merger market performance for specific
mergers. including the USAir-Piedmont merger.
make

post-merger

inferences

is

to

apply

The method by which they
the

structure-performance

coefficient estimates to the changes in the explanatory variables that
resulted from the merger.

Thus. for example. if the number of carriers

on a route fell from seven to six because of the merger. the coefficient
estimate on number of carriers
passenger

miles

(-.0062) multiplied

by the number of

flown on that route per year yields

an estimate

of

consumer loss. Using this coefficient. Morrison and Winston estimate that
the USAir-Piedmont merger should result in a consumer loss of $81 million
per year (1983 dollars).
In addition to the effect of mergers on fares, Morrison and Winston
also estimate the effects of mergers on other dimensions of consumer
welfare.
programs.

including
Schedule

transfer time. schedule
delay

is increased

delay. and frequent- flyer

to the extent

that

reduced

18Slot-constrained airports generally are defined as the four airports
at which the FAA has established slot allocation mechanisms. WashingtonNational, New York-LaGuardia. New York-Kennedy, and Chicago-O'Hare.
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competition results in fewer flights and thus in greater lengths of time
between passengers' desired flight time and the closest available flight
time.

Morrison and Winston first estimate passengers' value of schedule

delay time using a multinomial logit model of air traveler choices.

Then

they use the estimate of the output reduction due to reduced competition
to infer the reduction in number of flights.
estimate

to the estimated

reduction

Applying the value of time

in flights yields

the value

of

consumer loss due to increased schedule delay.
Transfer time can be affected if the merger results in the merged
firm's serving a greater range of routes.
carrier

implies that some previously

More routes served by a single

interline transfers

can now be

accomplished intraline, and this generally leads to shorter transfer times
because of intraline coordination.

Passengers' value of transfer time is

estimated to be much higher than their value of schedule delay time,
probably because passengers can make more productive use of time spent
before the actual flight than time spent between connecting flights.

The

estimated value of transfer time is applied to the estimated time savings
due to increased number of intraline transfers to yield consumer savings.
Frequent-flyer

benefits

may

result

from

a merger

because

the

increased number of routes served increases the value of the program to
members.

In their structure-performance

model, Morrison

and Winston

include a frequent-flyer variable, number of frequent-flyer miles awarded
on a route times the number of cities served by the airline, and obtain
a positive coefficient.

They then multiply

this coefficient

by the

increase in the number of cities served that results from the merger to
yield the increased value created by the enhanced frequent-flyer program.
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In the USAir-Piedmont merger, they estimate a gain to customers of $68
million per year (1983 dollars).
Morrison and Winston estimate several possible effects of airline
mergers that other approaches do not address.

The net effect of these

variables that they estimate for the USAir merger is an annual consumer
loss of $12.7 million per year.

However, these effects are derived from

the coefficient estimates from a structure-performance model that appears
to have many of the problems inherent in the other airline studies and
more generally in the very nature of structure-performance studies.
Structure-performance

studies have been criticized

for numerous

problems of model specification as well as significant data 1imitations.17
The recent airline studies do not appear to be immune from such problems.
One potentially

important problem with the airline studies is omitted

entry variables.

Entry impediments (such as gate and slot constraints)

and their effect on competitive performance may vary substantially across
geographic markets, and the entry variable proxies

employed

in these

studies, such as dummy variables for the few slot-constrained airports,
may miss the effects of many conditions of entry.
cities,

airlines'

contracts

apparently

restrictive

authorities

from

incumbents. 18

with

local

airport

majority-in-interest

expanding

airport

For example, in several

capacity

authorities

contain

clauses

preventing

without

the

consent

the
of

In addition, congestion at many airports, particularly

during the most desirable flight times, may result in scarcity rents that

17See Waterson (1984, ch. 10), Clarke and Davies (1982), and Phillips
(1976).
18See Air Transport World, December, 1988, p. 60.
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drive up fares.19
substantially

Such constraints and their effects on fares may vary

across airports

and, absent a thorough study of their

characteristics, are not likely to be reasonably proxied in cross-section
structure-performance studies.
If market concentration and entry barriers are positively correlated
across geographic markets in the industry, omission of relevant entry
variables will result in an upward bias on the concentration coefficients,
and thus in policy prescriptions biased toward antitrust intervention.
The degree of entry barriers and the degree of market concentration may
be

positively

correlated

because

the

supracompetitive

profits

from

achieving a higher market share, and thus the incentive to achieve a
higher market share, should be positively related to the degree of entry
barriers.
Residual

demand

elasticity

estimation

does

not

necessitate

structural variables such as measures of market concentration and entry
conditions,

and

thus

it is not

subject

to many

of

the sources

specification error that pervade structure-performance studies.

of

Residual

demand analysis approaches the (in some respects less ambitious) task of
estimating the competitive performance of firms rather than explaining the
underlying relationship between structure and performance.
of structural
estimates

variables

do not

will be

explain

implicit

the extent

The effects

in the estimates,

to which

individual

but

the

structural

19A recent FAA report notes that 21 US airports currently are
"seriously congested," because aircraft delays exceed 20,000 hours per
year. By the turn of the century, 50 airports are expected to be in this
category, and these airports handle 80% of US air traffic.
See "FAA
Predicts Big Jump in Air Traffic, Portending More Crowds, Few Bargains,"
Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1990, p. Bl.
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variables are responsible for the estimated performance.
performance on individual routes,residua1

By estimating

demand analysis can identify

which routes appear to be relatively problematic and thus which routes may
deserve po1icymakers'

attention.

In addition, partial residual demand

cross-elasticities can be estimated to make inferences about increases in
market power due to specific mergers on specific routes ..
Although

it does not raise

the same specification

problems

as

structure-performance, residual demand elasticity estimation raises other
specification

problems,

most

specific demand equation.

importantly

identification

Shifts of firm-specific

of the firm-

cost variables are

needed to identify firms' demand equations, and we will see that the data
set appears to be well suited to this task.
Residual demand elasticity analysis can be performed on both crosssection and time-series data.
cross-section

However, the data limitations that affect

structure-performance

analysis also would

section residua1-demand-e1asticity analysis.

affect cross-

An inability to control for

factors that may vary across geographic markets implies that cross-section
demand

elasticity

estimates.

estimates

may

be

less

useful

than

intra-market

In addition, it is individual markets that must be the focus

of analysis for many antitrust applications, such as the review of airline
mergers and gate sales.
But one advantage
demand elasticity

of cross-section

analysis

is that pre-merger

estimates can be compared to post-merger

estimates.

Such comparisons will be impractical with time-series data because of
limitations on the number of observations.
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In the airline industry,

quarterly data implies that a merger could not be analyzed using timeseries data until several years after it was consummated.
However,
problems.
chosen.

before-after

cross-section

comparisons

raise

other

Results may differ substantially depending on the quarters
For example, the quarter or two immediately following a merger

may not reflect the complete integration of the companies, and thus the
full

realization

of market

power

or

efficiencies.

The

multi-year

transition toward full integration of USAir and Piedmont illustrates this
point.

In addition, market power increases may appear large at first,

although entry may result and drive prices down.

Thus cross-section

comparisons may reflect quasi-rents rather than sustainable market power.
This point may be illustrated by the number of entrants into Minneapolisbased routes following the Northwest-Republic merger.
Another problem with comparing pre-merger and post-merger residual
demand elasticities may at first appear to be an advantage.

Post-merger

residual demand estimates will incorporate the actual effect of changes
in both market power and efficiency, both of which are relevant to the
welfare effects of a merger.

However, we will not be able to determine

the independent effect that the two factors had on the Lerner index.
Without holding either costs or market power constant, a change in a
Lerner index has ambiguous welfare consequences.

Substantial efficiencies

may result in increases in the Lerner index when the post-merger price
actually falls.

Methods for inferring market power changes from pre-

merger data such as the two approaches discussed in chapter 2, section IV,
while prospective,

are able to hold costs constant and thus are not
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subject

to

this

source

of

Efficiencies

ambiguity.

then

can

be

incorporated into the analysis (chapter 2, section V).
Last,

the before-after

cross-section

approach

can

address

the

effects of a merger only ex post, while antitrust agencies often must
estimate the effects of a merger ex ante.

While it certainly is useful

to look back on the actual effects of a merger, antitrust enforcement
often requires a forward-looking approach.

Thus, intra-market time-

series residual demand analysis appears to have substantial advantages
relative to both cross-section residual demand analysis and structureperformance analysis.

IV. Description of Data and Discussion of Specification Issues
A. Introduction
Since

Baker

and

Bresnahan's

application

of

residual

demand

elasticity estimation to the brewing industry (1984, 1985, 1988), no
further applications have appeared in the literature (with the exception
of Scheffman and Spiller's market definition application

(1987».

In

large part, this absence of applications is likely due to an absence of
appropriate data in many industries.

Residual demand analysis requires

detailed data on prices, outputs, and firm-specific costs.

\

In the airline

industry, regulatory requirements for reporting of cost and revenue data
are unusually extensive for an industry that is not price regulated.
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Indeed,

airline

industry

data appears

likely

to be

among

the best

available data for residual demand analysis.2o
. Until recently, residual demand elasticity estimation using timeseries data in the airline industry would have been impossible because of
the small number of post-deregulation

observations.

Revenue data are

available only on a quarterly basis, and price regulation was not relaxed
until

September,

1980.21

The revenue and output data are ayailable

beginning with the first quarter of 1981; thus 27 quarterly observations
are

available

before

the regulatory

approval

of

the USAir-Piedmont

acquisition.
The two firms competed in about 30 city pairs at the time of the
merger.

But the two firms competed in only nine city pairs throughout the

entire sample period.
us to these city pairs.

The limited number of observations thus restricts
The five routes used were chosen because of their

relatively stable structural characteristics during the sample period.

20Additional applications of the method may be feasible in many
industries, for example in markets for products sold in groceries, partly
because of the increased availability and quality of supermarket UPC
scanner data (for an example of the use of this data, see Katz and
Shapiro, 1984).
In some industries, although some of the necessary data
may not be publicly-available, firms in the market may have the necessary
data.
Antitrust agencies may subpoena the necessary data during the
course of investigations. It may be possible in some cases to perform the
analysis even under stringent Hart-Scott-Rodino time constraints.
21Prices were not completely deregulated until January 1, 1983.
However, pricing regulations had been relaxed sufficiently that generally
there was substantial unused upward and downward pricing flexibility, and
thus pricing was essentially deregulated, by September, 1980 (Bailey,
Graham, and Kaplan, 1985, chapter 3).
Entry deregulation moved at a
faster pace .than pricing deregulation, and was essentially fully
deregulated by January, 1980 (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1985, chapter
4).
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Most of the data for this analysis was obtained from the databases
of Reuters· Information
includes

Services

data

collected

Transportation.

Revenue

from

(formerly IP Sharp Associates).
air

carriers

and output

data

by

come

the
from

which

Department

of

the Origin

and

Destination Data Base (0&0), the cost data from Form 41, and other data
from the Service Segment and T9 data bases.

The variables are summarized

in the appendix.
Recall from chapter 2. section II that firm l's residual demand
function is
(3.1)

where Y is a vector of exogenous demand variables, Ware

industry-wide

input costs, and Wo are firm-specific costs for the competitors of firm 1.
W ' input costs that are specific to firm 1 (i.e. not elements of W or
1
W ), are used in the first-stage regression, Q1-a+l:buWu'
The second-stage
o
regression estimates (4), substituting the fitted values of Q1 from the
first-stage

regression

for Q1.22

The residual demand function can be

estimated in loglinear form, so that the coefficients on quantities will
be elasticities.
P1 -

(3.2)

where

01

00

Denoting xJ-lnXJ'
+ 0lq1 +

r1'y

+ 0l'W + v1

estimates the residual demand elasticity

e1'

Similarly,

the

partial residual demand function can be estimated by
(3.3)

where 0iJ estimates eiJp'
For each city pair, the demand elasticities from six specifications
are estimated: pre-merger for USAir, pre-merger for Piedmont, post-merger
22This estimation technique is discussed in chapter 2, section II.
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for USAir

(Baker & Bresnahan

method), post-merger

method),

post-merger

for Piedmont

(B&B

for the combined firm (alternative method proposed

in chapter 2, section IV), and for a hypothetical monopolist on the route
(market demand elasticity, also discussed in chapter 2, section IV).
all the specifications,

price is quarterly

In

average revenue, aggregated

across coach and coach discount, and aggregated across one-coupon and twocoupon itineraries.

In the pre-merger and post-merger (B&B-method) cases,

price is calculated for each firm individually.

In the alternative-method

post-merger specification, price is calculated as a weighted average price
of the merging firms.

In the market specification,

price is a weighted

average across all airlines serving the route.
In the pre-merger

specification,

w includes an industry average

operating expenditures variable (per revenue passenger mile), and/or the
same variable for the major incumbents other than firm 1.

Also included

in w is a cost of capital measure and a retail gasoline price index.
Wi1 in the first stage of the pre-merger specification
first stage of the B&B-method
expenses
personnel

per

revenue

post-merger

passenger

mile

specification

for fuel,

pilots

and in the

are firm 1's
and

copilots,

expenses, airframe repair labor, engine repair labor, engine

maintenance parts, and airframe maintenance parts for the aircraft it flew
on the route.

In the alternative-method

twelve instruments,

post-merger results, wil includes

the six listed above for both of the merging firms.

In the market specification, wil includes the six variables calculated as
weighted averages of those variables for the incumbent firms.
Demand variables
and advertising

(y) include income measures for the two endpoints

and promotion

expenditures
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for firm 1.

The following

three subsections provide more details about the price and quantity data,
cost data, and other variables,

including discussions of specification

issues.
B. Price and Quantity Data
The 0&0 data are based on carriers' submissions of computer tape
records of 10% of the passenger tickets sold (those with ticket numbers
ending with the digit 0).

An itinerary is included in the sample for a

particular city pair (or "directional segment") A to B if the passenger
flew (1) a direct flight from A to B without continuing

(or B to A; a

round trip itinerary is treated as equivalent to two one-way tickets), (2)
from A to B, and then on to C, where point C is closer to A than B is to
A (I.e. point B is a "directional break"), or (3) an indirect flight from
A to D to C, if the stop at D does not constitute a directional break.
The 0&0 data are based on actual retail transaction prices, net of
discounts, rather than retail list prices, wholesale prices, or advertised
prices, as some studies estimating demand elasticities
variations

have used

(e.g.,

Baker and Bresnahan

and conjectural

- advertised

prices;

L1iang - wholesale list prices).
Some observations

are eliminated

from the sample

(by the data

vendor, Reuters), because they appear likely to be the result of reporting
error.23 Another adjustment is made to the data to account for firms that
report more or less than 10% of their tickets, by correcting the number

230bservations are eliminated from the sample only if (a) non-numeric
fare data is recorded, (b) the itinerary has more than one directional
break, or (c) the recorded fare is more than $1,000 and the revenue per
passenger mile is more than $2. For example, a Baltimore-Tampa ticket
would be eliminated from the sample only if its one-way fare exceeds
$1,684 or its round trip fare exceeds $3,368.
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of passengers based on another source (Form 41 Tl) that collects the
universe of tickets to measure output but not revenue or price.

Thus if

a carrier underreports, this method assumes that the fares of the reported
tickets are representative of the fares of the unreported tickets.
observations

The

..

eliminated from the sample because of apparent reporting

error, discussed above, ..
are corrected for similarly.
Total revenue and quantity of tickets are reported for each quarter,
carrier, and city pair, for each of eight fare categories (first class,
first-class discount, coach, coach discount, other, miscellaneous/unknown,
frequent flyer, and mixed-fare class).

For the results presented, the

data were aggregated across coach and coach discount fare categories.
These two categories constitute over 90% of the tickets sold; thus further
aggregation produced similar results.

Disaggregating further, to coach

only or coach discount only, appears to create a relatively arbitrary
distinction.

Coach and coach discount are not precisely defined and do

not appear to be defined consistently across carriers or across time for
a given carrier.
As well as being reported separately by fare category, the data are
reported separately for one, two, three, and four-or-more "coupons."
one-coupon
nonstop

ticket

flights

is

are

not necessarily
one-coupon

a nonstop

tickets.

The

flight, although
number

of

A
all

"coupons"

corresponds to the number of flight numbers; thus a one-stop flight could
be either a one-coupon or two-coupon flight, depending on whether the
carrier chooses to give separate flight numbers to the two legs.

This is

another somewhat arbitrary distinction, although it appears to separate
most nonstops from most one-stops.

The results are reported for data
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aggregated across one coupon and two coupon.

Three coupons and four-or-

more coupons are very few, and are not included.
Baker and Bresnahan (1984, p. 49) suggest that aggregation of data
across products in multiproduct firms may bias results toward elasticity.
They argue that aggregation may dampen the fluctuations in the independent
variables,

thus resulting in their explanatory power being suppressed.

Because inverse elasticities are being estimated, a downward bias in the
coefficient

would

result,

Baker and Bresnahan

toward

apparently

competitive

performance.

also note that aggregation will yield an average

elasticity and thus may result in overlooking relatively inelastic demand
that may exist for some disaggregated product categories.

In airlines,

perhaps aggregation across coach and coach discount could have this bias
if coach passengers have less elastic demand than those passengers who
are able to meet the restrictions on the discounted tickets.

It might

appear that focussing on coach (and thus not including coach discount)
might result in more inelastic demand because this group of passengers may
be largely those who are not able to meet the restrictions required for
discounted seats.

Disaggregated estimates of individual fare categories

did not yield elasticity estimates that were consistently below or above
the reported results (and the regression fit generally was significantly
poorer).

However, this result may be largely because the fare categories

are not defined

in an economically

meaningful

way, rather

airlines have not successfully price discriminated.
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than that

C. Cost Data
As discussed in chapter 2, section II, residual demand est.imation
requires firm-specific cost data in order to identify firm-level residual
demand curves.

An abundance of firm-specific cost data is available for

the airline industry; accordingly it is not necessary to resort to the use
of proxies such as firms' capacity, as in Baker and Bresnahan's brewing
industry applications

(1985, 1988).

The cost data from Form 41 is

reported by each firm on a quarterly basis, for numerous categories of
costs (see table 3.2 below; other cost variables are also available),
separately for each type of aircraft flown (DC9-l0, DC9-30, 727-100, 727200, etc.).

The cost data are not specific to the particular city-pair

markets being served.

But because of the mobility of capital in this

industry, much of the cost of operating a given type of aircraft by a
given

carrier

in a

given

quarter

should

not

be

expected

to vary

dramatically across city pairs.
In order for a firm's residual demand equation to be identified, its
costs must shift independently of other firms' costs.
appear relatively

Airline

costs

likely to satisfy this criterion,. in part because

competing carriers often use different aircraft to fly the same routes,
and

these

maintenance

aircraft

have

requirements.

significantly

different

fuel,

crew,

For example, on the Baltimore-Tampa

and

route,

Piedmont flew DC9-30s almost solely, throughout the sample period, while
USAir flew primarily 737s.24

Even when competing airlines use the same

24It may appear surprising that two competing carriers would persist
in the long run in flying different aircraft on the same city pair,
because significantly different degrees of fuel efficiency and passenger
capacity would appear to imply that a particular aircraft model should be
(continued .•.)
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type of aircraft, their costs differ due to different compensation of
flight crew and maintenance

personnel,

different

aircraft, different number of seats per aircraft,

number

of crew per

and other factors.

However, it is not absolute differences across competitors in components
of marginal costs, but independent shifting of these variables that is
required to identify residual demand functions.

Certain cost variables,

such as fuel, may be highly correlated across carriers.

The following

table shows the lack of correlation between the components of USAir's and
Piedmont's

costs used as instruments,

Baltimore-Tampa

for the aircraft

during the sample period.

they flew on

This lack of correlation

suggests that the use of these variables as instruments in the residual
demand estimation should identify firm-level demand.

Table 3.2: Cross-Carrier Cost-Component Correlation Coefficients
USAir DC9-30 - Piedmont 737-200
(real costs per revenue passenger mile)
fuel
pilots-copilots
personnel expenses
airframe repair labor
engine repair labor
engine maintenance parts
airframe maintenance parts

.98
.44
.26
.16
.01
.01
.44

It is not immediately clear which components of airlines' costs
should be considered important components of the marginal cost that is
24 ( ••• continued)
optimal on a particular route. One possible explanation is that carriers
may base their choice of aircraft models on their efficiency on a certain
range of route distances, and one of the carriers tended to fly on longer
routes. Scale economies of purchasing and/or maintenance of aircraft may
then offset the efficiencies of selecting the optimal aircraft for each
individual route.
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relevant for firms' pricing decisions.

The incremental cost of each

additional passenger on an already-scheduled flight should be quite low,
including only the costs of a small amount of fuel to carry the additional
weight of the passenger and baggage, one additional meal or snack, and
additional baggage handling and ticketing.

But the data are aggregated

well beyond the level of the incremental passenger.
price, output, and costs are quarterly.
to divert aircraft

relatively

Observations

of

Incumbent carriers may be able

easily across many

city pairs over a

quarterly time horizon, and thus aircraft operating expenses such as fuel,
crew, and equipment maintenance expenses can be considered to be relevant
marginal costs.
Estimation of a firm's residual demand elasticity requires that its
firm-specific costs be included as instrumental variables

in the first

stage regression and its competitors' costs as exogenous variables in the
second stage. The second-stage cost variables are aggregated into a total
expenditure variable that is an aggregate of the component costs discussed
above, for each competitor for the aircraft flown by that competitor on
that route.

Thus for example on Baltimore-Tampa, USAir's residual demand

equation includes total operating expenditures per revenue passenger mile
for Piedmont's 737-200s, Delta's 727-200s, and Eastern's 727-200s.

On

routes on which there were not sizable incumbents, an industry aggregate
cost variable was constructed

to represent potential entrants'

costs.

Other possible industry cost variables, including indices of landing fees,
food

expenditures,

and

advertising

expenses

did

not

prove

significant and are not included in the reported regressions.
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to

be

In the B&B-method post-merger specifications, the cost variables are
the same as in the pre-merger

specification.

But in the alternative-

method post-merger results, both USAir' s and Piedmont's costs are included
as instruments in the first stage, because the method aggregates prices
and quantities

across

the merger

partners.

The costs

only

for the

competitors other than the merger partners is included in the second stage
of this specification.

For the "market" specification, price and quantity

are aggregated across all the incumbents, so all airline costs appear as
instruments in the first stage only.
As Froeb and Werden illustrate (1990, p. 15), if the variance of the
cost shifters constitutes a small proportion of the variance of the firm's
marginal cost, and/or if the cost shifters are highly correlated across
firms, the variance of the instrumental variables estimator will be high.
Table 3.2 illustrates

that the latter issue does not appear to raise a

problem in this case, but the former problem may be more difficult
detect.

If the cost shifters constitute a high proportion

cost, the problem should be unlikely.

to

of marginal

In this case, the cost shifters

constitute about 70% of non-overhead expenses (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan,
1985, p. 49).

However, it could be the case that omitted cost shifters,

though they constitute a small percentage of marginal cost, constitute a
relatively high percentage

of firm-specific variance

in marginal

cost.

Variables such as landing fees, reservation and sales expenses, and the
implicit rental value of aircraft and gates are not included.
these variables
proportion

appear relatively unlikely

of firm-specific

should be equivalent

variance

for competitors
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However,

to be the source of a high

in marginal

cost.

Landing

on a given route, reservation

fees
and

sales are performed very similarly across the industry, and a relatively
efficient secondary market for aircraft and a market for options to buy
aircraft imply that the implicit rental value of aircraft should not
produce much firm-specific cost variance.
Another cost variable included is the cost of capital, Moody's index
of yields on Baa corporate bonds.
Memphis-Nashville

In addition, on the two shorter routes,

and Washington-Norfolk,

the retail gasoline component

of the Consumer Price Index is included.
D. Other Variables
Other variables

in the regressions include income, advertising,

quarterly dummies and a time-trend dummy.

The income variable

is the

simple sum of personal income in the two metropolitan areas that are the
endpoints of the city pair.
income.

The measure is total income, not per capita

Constructing the variable this way allows it to account both for

per capita income growth and for population growth.
per

capita

income

may

not

affect

airline

While population and

demand

proportionally,

regressions run with these two variables specified separately did not
significantly affect the results; thus they were combined in this way to
conserve degrees of freedom.

Advertising expenditures are included, but

they are reported only nationally

for each carrier, and thus are not

specific to the individual markets.

Quarterly dummies are included to

control for seasonal variations in demand.
Dummy variables

are included in some of the specifications

account for short-term shocks to the structure of competition
individual routes.

to

on the

On Baltimore-Tampa, a dummy is included for the period

preceding Piedmont's

introduction of nonstop service on that route in
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1QS3.

On Baltimore-Orlando,

a dummy is included for the three-quarter

period in which World Airways entered the route and gained up to a 25%
share.

Similarly, a dummy is included for Boston-Norfolk for Eastern's

five-quarter presence, during which it gained a market share of up to lSi.
Because

we

are

estimating

residual

demand

elasticities

for

individual city pairs, it may appear that we implicitly assume that city
pairs

are

relevant

geographic

Guidelines, 1984, section 2.3).

markets

(as

defined

in

the

Merger

It also may appear that we implicitly

assume that commercial air travel is a relevant product market.

While the

demand characteristics of city pairs in many instances may be supportive
of a relevant city-pair market, supply substitutability may imply that a
broader geographic market is more appropriate in many instances.

While

excluding relevant competition will bias market concentration measures,
there is no a priori reason to expect residual demand estimates to be
biased, because the effect of any form of competition should be reflected
implicitly in the demand elasticities (as discussed in chapter 2, section
III) .

V. Results
A. General Discussion
Regression coefficients for thirty regressions (six for each of the
five routes), t-statistics, and market concentration data are reported in
table 3.3.
The

The complete regression results are reported in the appendix.

coefficients

elasticities

are

reported

as

and thus are proxies

negative

inverse

for the Lerner

discussed in chapter 2, section III.
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residual

demand

index (L--1/e), as

Results are reported for pre-merger

specifications for each firm. for post-merger specifications based on the
B&B method and the alternative proposed method, and for a market (I.e.
hypothetical monopolist) specification.
On the pre-merger results. note that low t-statistics (particularly
on Memphis-Nashville)

indicate

that

quantity

is ,not

significant

in

explaining price. thus implying a highly elastic residual demand function.
Post-merger

results are given for both the Baker and Bresnahan

(B&B)

method. discussed in chapter 2. section IV.A. and an alternative method
proposed in chapter 2. section IV.B. Recall that the B&B method estimates
partial residual demand equations for each of the two merging firms and
sums the own- and cross-partial residual demand elasticities estimated in
each equation to yield an estimate of the post-merger demand elasticity.
Thus their method results in separate post-merger results for each firm
while the alternative method estimates a single post-merger result for the
combined firm.

For the B&B-method results. first the sum is reported.

then the own- and cross-partial
post-merger

result.

Baltimore-Orlando

terms that were added to calculate the

For example. the post-merger

result for USAir on

is .61. the sum of the own-partial

partial (.05) elasticities.

(.56) and cross-

The alternative method estimates the residual

demand elasticity for the weighted average price and total quantity of the
merging firms.
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TABIE 3.3

MEMPHIS'
NASHVILLE

BOSTON'
NORFOLK

WASHINGTON'
NORFOLK

BALTIMORE'
TAMPA

BALTIMORE'
ORLANOO

.58 (4.0)
.03 (0.2)

L··lIe

PREMERGER
USAIR
PIEDMONT
POSTMERGER
B&8 Method
USAIR
own

eros.
PIEOMONT
own
eros.
Alt Method

'.05 (0.1) . .14 (2.1)
'.09 (0.6)
.43 (3.7)

.09 (2.9)
.06 (0.3)

.20 (2.5)
.20 (1.5)

.05
'.06
.10
••09
.02
'.12
'.05

.11
.09
.02
.07
.04
.03
.10

.25
.15
.10
.19
.18
.01
.23

MARKET

(0.8)
(1.0)
(0.4)
(0.8)
(0.5)

.43 (3.6)

.61
.13
.48
.63
.53
.10
.68

(4.0)
(7.4)
(4.8)
(2.3)
(4.9)

.83 (5.6)

(2.7)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.6)
(5.2)

.25 (3.1)

.61
.56
.05
.16
••02
.18
.44

(1.3)
(0.6)
(0.8)
(0.1)
(1.4)

(3.9)
(0.4)
(0.2)
(2.3)
(4.2)

.41 (2.3)

.86 (4.3)

2825
1826
4701

2963
960
3923

.30
.38
.19
.11

US .20
PI .24
EA .44
DL .09

HHI
PREMERGER
INCREASE
POSTMERGER

3339
182
3521

4859
3250

.07
.13
.40
.39

US .25
PI .65
EA .03

4268
3534
7802

8109

MARKET SHARES
USAIR
PIEDMONT
OTHER

US
PI
NW
AM

US
PI
UA
TW

.57
.31
.07
.03

US
PI
EA
DL

Market power increases can be inferred by the significance
cross-partial

term in addition

cross-partialresult)

and the own-elasticities

exceeds

insignificant

to the degree to which

the

pre-merger

cross-partial

of the

the sum of the

(L.e. the reported post-merger

residual

demand

elasticity.

An

term indicates that the pricing behavior of

the one firm is not affected by the pricing behavior of the other and thus
that other factors (e.g., other competitors, the threat of entry, costs,
highly elastic consumer demand) are the critical constraints on the firm's
pricing.
After
"hypothetical

the

premerger

and

postmerger

monopolist' sn demand

results,

elasticity
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is

the

"market"

presented.

This

or
is

estimated using the same method as the combined post-merger estimates, the
price

being

competitors

the

weighted

average

price,

in

this

case

across

all

on the route, and the quantity being the total number of

carriers on the route.
Note that the Herfindah1 indices (HHls) on all the routes are in the
Merger Guidelines' "highly concentrated" range (above 1800, post-merger).
The HHI increases reSUlting from the merger also fall in the Guidelines'
upper range (above 100). The Guidelines state that "only in extraordinary
circumstances"
competition

will

a

merger

be

considered

not

likely

to

lessen

if both the level and increase in market power are in the

upper range (1984, section 3.11). But city-pair routes may not constitute
relevant markets as defined in the Merger Guidelines; thus application of
Guidelines' thresholds to these figures may be inappropriate.

Although

these routes all have market concentration in the Guidelines' upper range,
a significant degree of variation in market concentration

exists across

the routes, both with respect to the level (a range of 3500-8100) and the
increase (a range of 180-3500) in the HHI brought about by the merger.
The concentration figures are averages over the time series, and thus do
not necessarily reflect the market concentration that existed at the time
of the merger.

For example, if a carrier had a thirty percent share

during one-third of the sample period then exited, its share appears as
ten percent.
The results are reported for regressions

run on data aggregated

across coach and coach discount fare categories, and across one-coupon and
two-coupon flights.

These categories are defined, and aggregation across

them discussed, in section IV.B above.
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In time-series regression analysis, autocorrelation, the correlation
of error terms, can arise and affect the efficiency of the estimators,
thus biasing

standard errors downward.

The Durbin-Watson

statistics

reported in the appendix indicate that autocorrelation does not appear to
be

a

problem

in

these

regressions.

The

null

hypothesis

autocorrelation cannot be rejected for any of the specifications.
specifications with the lowest Durbin-Watson

of

no

For the

statistics, the Cochrane-

Orcutt procedure was run and did not generate notably different results.
Note that the inclusion of a time-trend variable and the absence of lagged
dependent variables mitigate potential autocorrelation problems.
B. Comparisons of Pre-merger, Post-merger, and Market Demand Elasticities
For each route, estimated pre-merger market power is less than or
equal to estimated post-merger market power, and estimated post-merger
market power is less than the estimated market power of the hypothetical
monopolist.

Thus it appears

successfully

distinguished

elasticities.

that the estimation

technique may have

among the three distinct

levels of demand

Neither of the alternative methods of making post-merger

inferences distinguishes itself as superior to the other.

The "combined"

post-merger results appear to be very close to weighted averages of the
firm-specific B&B-method post-merger results.
The estimates of the market power of the hypothetical monopolist
provide an estimate of the maximum degree of market power that could be
generated on each route.

For example, on Washington-Norfolk, where even

a monopolist would be able to price at only 25% above marginal cost,
mergers provide

much

less potential

threat to consumer welfare

than

mergers on routes in which the hypothetical monopolist could price 80% or
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more above marginal cost.

Because in many industries cost data is not

firm-specific, often only market demand elasticities can be estimated.
In these instances,
provide

useful

created.

estimates

estimates

However,

of market

of the maximum

this suggests

demand elasticity
market power

that results

that could be

indicating

market power, such as those of Baker and Bresnahan,

can still

substantial

could be biased

because a lack of firm-specific data may imply that we are erroneously
estimating market demand elasticity rather than firm-specific residual
demand elasticity.
On the Memphis-Nashville route, the coefficients are negative, but
they are near zero, and their t-statistics are very low, suggesting a flat
residual

demand

curve.

The

cross-partial

coefficients

also

are not

significant, suggesting that the merger will not create market power on
this route.
USAir

This result is not surprising because the market shares of

and Piedmont are low (7% and 13% respectively,

although

these

figures still place the merger within the Guidelines' upper range) and the
relatively short distance of the route25 implies that air travel may face
significant competition from ground travel.
Boston-Norfolk, on the other hand, exhibits significant market power
for both firms premerger and a relatively strong market power increase due
to the merger, with the estimated post-merger Lerner index approaching
that of the hypothetical monopolist.

The highly significant cross-partial

coefficients on this route suggest that the presence of the other carrier

25The driving distances of the routes are Memphis-Nashville - 209
miles, Boston-Norfolk - 581 miles, Washington-Norfolk
189 miles,
Baltimore-Tampa - 950 miles, Baltimore-Orlando - 892 miles.
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was a substantial constraint on USAir's and Piedmont's pricing on this
route.

The two firms combined market share on the route is 90 percent.
Washington-Norfolk

exhibits a small degree of pre-merger

market

power (6-9% Lerner indices). and the coefficient for USAir is significant
while the one for Piedmont is not.
pre-merger

estimates but only slightly. with very low t-values on the

cross-partial coefficients.
performance

The post-merger estimates exceed the

The results indicating relatively competitive

in the presence of high market concentration

part to competition

may be due in

from ground travel. the presence of United and TWA

with small market shares. and/or the threat of entry.

However. we might

expect that entry into slot-constrained Washington-National
be relatively difficult. while the Washington-Norfolk
competitive.

Apparently.

travel competition

the existing

are sufficient

Airport would

results are highly

fringe competitors

to maintain

relatively

and ground
competitive

pricing even in the presence of what may be substantial entry barriers.
On Baltimore-Tampa.

both USAir and Piedmont appear to be able to

price about 20% above marginal cost, and the merger does not appear to
increase their market power significantly, in spite of an HHI increase of
over 1800.
On Baltimore-Orlando. USAir appears to have significant market power
while Piedmont does not. The coefficients suggest that Piedmont will gain
significant market power from the merger but that USAir will not.

These

results may appear anomalous because one might expect that two competitors
with similar market shares (20 and 24%) should have similar degrees of
market power (as is the case, for example. on Baltimore-Tampa).

As it

turns out, the discrepancy may be produced at least in part by the fact
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that USAir flew about 93% of its passengers on this route nonstop, while
Piedmont flew 6S% of its passengers nonstop.

Because Piedmont directed

many of its passengers through Charlotte on this route, its costs likely
were relatively high, and thus it should be expected to command a lower
average markup

than its rival.

Indeed, for flights

booked,

the cost to Piedmont of a passenger

Orlando

through

Charlotte

includes

that were

fully

flying from Baltimore

the opportunity

to

cost due to that

passenger's displacing two alternative passengers, one from Baltimore to
Charlotte and another from Charlotte to Orlando.
that incorporates

(For a pricing model

the effects of this form of supply substitution,

see

K1eit and Maynes, 1990.)
The Boston-Norfolk

results exhibit a similar discrepancy

in the

residual demand elasticities, but in this case it is Piedmont that has the
relatively high markup.

Just as in the previous case, it turns out that

the carrier with the more elastic demand is also the carrier that flew a
relatively higher proportion of one-stop flights on the route.

Piedmont

flew 86% of its flights direct and USAir flew 73% of its flights direct.
In addition, on this route Piedmont had a much greater market share than
USAir

(65% vs. 25%).

Piedmont's higher market share suggests that it

likely offered more flights per day on average than USAir.

If Piedmont

offered several flights per day and USAir were somehow limited to offering
only one or two flights per day on this route, Piedmont's preferable
product selection may have enabled it to charge somewhat higher prices
than USAir.

However, these effects may not explain fully the differences

in the coefficients.

so

~-----~---~~-----

These apparent asymmetries between competitors raise some doubt
about the degree to which the data conform to the symmetry assumption
required by the methods used to calculate post-merger and market demand
elasticities (discussed in chapter 2, section IV).

At first glance, it

may appear that the symmetric competition assumption would be reasonable
in

the

airline

industry.

Though

certainly

not

homogeneous,

two

competitors' air travel services from city a to city b in many cases do
not appear to be characterized by substantial net advantages for one of
the competitors.

However, in many cases, one carrier offers a package of

services that may be preferred by a significant proportion of customers,
such as more

departures,

performance,

better

carrier

then

may

Accordingly,

preferable

departure

times, better

in-flight services, and shorter
face more

61fi/SPz-S1fz/SP1

inelastic

demand

than

may not be satisfied.

on-time

layovers.

This

its competitors.
The direction and

magnitude of any bias that may be introduced by this asymmetry is not
clear.
C. Comparisons Across the Five Routes
The empirical method estimates only the level of market power; it
does not explain the causal factors leading to the existence of market
power.

The sources of differences in market power often may be readily

apparent, for example differing degrees of market concentration.

However,

in some cases apparent differences in competitive performance may appear
to be anomalies, because we often may have limited information about
differences in entry conditions and other structural characteristics of
markets.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which apparent anomalies
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result from data and specification problems or from market power sources
that are not readily apparent.
Comparisons across markets are subject to less ambiguity in the
current case, in which we are comparing across geographic markets within
a given product market, than in cases in which comparisons across product
markets are attempted, because many structural characteristics should be
expected to be similar across the cross-section.
unobserved

differences

However, substantial

in structural characteristics

still may exist.

While many of the costs of airlines will be similar across routes,
significant variations in competitive performance across airline routes
may result from differences in landing fees, gate and slot allocations,
demand characteristics, and other route-, airline-, and airport-specific
factors.

In addition, in this case there are only five cross-section

observations from which to make comparisons.
of the variations
observed

However, the fact that many

in the results across routes appear to result from

structural

differences

provides

some

confirmation

of

the

soundness of the results.
Note that the estimated market demand elasticity on the two shorter
routes

(MemphiS-Nashville

and

Washington-Norfolk)

indicates

that

a

monopolist on these routes would have less ability to raise prices than
a

monopolist

on

longer

routes,

competition from ground travel.
increase

is

lowest

on

the

perhaps

in

large

part

because

of

In addition, the estimated market power

two short

routes

(Memphis-Nashville

and

Washington-Norfolk) and highest on a longer route with a relatively high
increase in market concentration (Boston-Norfolk).
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Washington-Norfolk

results provide an interesting contrast to the

Memphis-Nashville and Boston-Norfolk results.

Because the route distance

is about the same as that of Memphis-Nashville, the degree of competition
from ground travel should be comparable.

Yet the market concentration

figures are very similar to those on Boston-Norfolk, which exhibited a
significant market power increase.

Thus it appears that competition from

ground travel may prevent anticompetitive pricing on this short route in
spite of high market concentration.
The results in Memphis-Nashville and Baltimore-Tampa suggest that
the Merger Guidelines' HHI thresholds may be unreasonably low, because no
market power appears to be produced by the merger on either of the two
routes, despite market concentration levels and increases that are well
into the Guidelines' upper ranges.
on the five routes
concentration,

the

Further, since estimated market power

is not a strictly increasing
results

suggest

that

strict

function of market
application

of

HHI

thresholds may be inappropriate even within a given product market, let
alone across product markets.

Of course, such conclusions are premature

given the limited scope of this study, but perhaps further appl1cations
will

cast

further

light

on

the

reasonableness

of

the

Guidelines'

thresholds.
D. Route Spinoffs and Efficiency Gains
One possible

remedy

for airline mergers

that are found

to be

anticompetitive is to require spinoffs of gates and slots in the overlap
markets.

However, in the deregulated airline industry airlines do not

have rights to individual routes, so routes cannot be spun off, only gates
and slots can be.

Yet the analysis points to possible anticompetitive
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problems on specific routes, not at specific airports.

In any event, we

can simulate a route spinoff by simulating an alternative merger with
another incumbent on the route.

In policy applications, analysis might

find that a number of routes from a given airport raise competitive
concerns and that a spinoff of gates from one of the incumbents may
provide opportunities for other carriers to compete on the problem routes,
although it would not guarantee that the recipients of the gates would
The simulation assumes that we can spin off

compete on those routes.

specific routes, because the simulation is equivalent to the simulation
of a merger on that route.

The estimated market power effect of the

spinoff can then be compared to the estimated effect of the merger.
Incumbents with market shares smaller than the merging firms may be
the most obvious candidates for spinoffs.

However, in order to simulate

a spinoff, the firms must have competed long enough to accumulate enough
observations to perform the analysis.

Many firms with small market shares

may not have competed throughout the sample period, in which case such
simulations often may'not be possible.

In the current application, we

estimated a significant market power increase on two routes, and the
competitors with smaller market shares than USAir and Piedmont did not
compete

throughout

the

sample period.

Thus

in this

case,

spinoff

simulation is not possible.
Chapter 2, section 5 derives a formula for estimating the critical
level of efficiency gain that would prevent the post-merger price from
exceeding the pre-merger price:

(3.4)

~1~11P12p

1+e1
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Applying

this formula to the Boston-Norfolk

route, the critical

reduction in marginal cost for USAir is 41% and for Piedmont is 14%. The
only other statistically significant market power increase is for Piedmont
on Baltimore-Orlando.

The critical efficiency gain in this case is 13%.

While these figures appear high, efficiencies realized by the merger may
have been spread across all overlap routes, including routes with little
or no anticompetitive effect, such as Memphis-Nashville.

If such is the

case, the critical level of efficiency gain would be much lower.

For

example, if we assume that the estimated competitive effects on the five
routes are representative of the routes for which an efficiency gain also
will result from the merger, a 7% reduction in marginal cost would be
sufficient to prevent an increase in average price.28

Of course, a much

smaller efficiency gain would be sufficient to offset the deadweight loss
from the price increases.

Further, reductions in fixed costs also may

result and would add to total surplus, but would not affect pricing.

VI. Conclusion
Residual demand elasticities were estimated at the pre-merger, postmerger, and market level for five routes on which USAir and Piedmont
competed

prior

to merging

in 1987.

These

results

suggest

that

a

significant degree of market power existed on some routes prior to the
merger and that increased market power appears likely to result from the
merger on some routes.

Other routes exhibited highly elastic residual

demand in spite of high levels of market concentration.

Because of the

26This also assumes that each of the routes handle the same number of
passengers: .07-(.41+.14+.13)/10.
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limited scope of this study, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions
from the~e results about the net effects of the merger on the numerous
routes affected, or on the effects of airline mergers generally.

As the

results

across

suggest, competitive

performance

may vary considerably

routes.
The results do suggest that residual demand analysis can provide
significant insights about competition that other analytical methods such
as structure-performance

analysis and the DOJ-Merger-Guidelines

often may be unable to provide.

approach

This point raises the question of the

potential usefulness of residual demand analysis for antitrust policy and
enforcement.

The stringent data requirements

and the requirement

of

independent shifts of firm-specific cost components necessarily imply that
the method could be used in only a small minority of cases, and thus could
act only as a complement not a substitute for the Merger Guidelines'
methodology.
Even if the methodology were more widely applicable, it is unlikely
that it could ever replace the Guidelines method.

Yhile residual demand

estimation synthesizes the relevant factors that affect competition into
a single statistic, it is unlikely that enforcement officials would ever
rely on such a statistic absent support in the form of descriptions of the
observable variables

that affect competition

in a given market.

The

Merger Guidelines approach provides such relevant descriptive information
about an industry.
The Guidelines approach is standardized, generally applicable, and
based in large part on sound economic theory.

However, it often is not

applicable in a rigorous manner, and thus objective applications of the
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method can yield opposite conclusions.

For example. the data necessary

to apply rigorously the Guidelines' "5% test" for defining geographic and
product markets often is not available. and thus often more than one
market

definition

concentration
dramatically

is consistent with

available

information.

Market

figures in these alternative proposed markets can vary
and

thus yield

opposing

competitive effects of a merger.

conclusions

about

the

likely

Similarly there often is substantial

disagreement about the conditions of entry and their implications for
competitive performance in a given industry. In cases such as these where
standard analysis yields ambiguous results. residual demand analysis may
have its greatest potential value.
Further. the benefits of an application of residual demand analysis
may significantly exceed the value of the results in the individual case
for which they are estimated.
understanding

of

the method

understanding

of competition

Applications of the method will add to the
useful

in future

applications.

in the industry useful

outside

to

the

of the

immediate application. and to the understanding of competition issues and
resulting policy implications more generally.
To the extent that residual demand estimates appear inconsistent
with

directly

observable

industry variables.

and

this

inconsistency

persists across a number of applications. the inconsistency may lead us
to question commonly held beliefs about the competitive importance of
those industry variables.

Similarly. results may suggest that certain

industry variables be given greater or lesser weight in our analyses than
they commonly have been given in the past.

Economic theory does not

provide unambiguous guidance. and the Guidelines do not suggest any rules •
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for

determining

concentration

the

appropriate

measures

and

the

weights
numerous

to

be

other

placed

on

potentially

market
relevant

observable market variables in judging the competitive significance of
mergers.
Applications of the methodology are not without costs.

In cases in

which an existing appropriate data set is available at low marginal cost
(e.g., the airline industry), it may be worthwhile to apply the method in
most cases.

However, the costs of generating a data set may be high in

some cases, and may outweigh the benefits from a single estimation of
residual demand elasticities. The opportunities for applications that are
likely to yield net benefits may be increasing due to the increased
availability. and quality of
data

sources,

improvements

upe

scanner data.

in residual

Thus with improvements in

demand

elasticity

estimation

methodology, and a greater understanding of the potential value of the
methodology,

further

applications

may be judged

productive.
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to be

increasingly

APPENDIX
Dependent Variable
PRICE - log real average revenue aggregated across coach, coach discount,
one coupon and two coupons. For the first four specifications for each
route, this variable is firm specific; for the fifth specification
("combined"), this variable is a weighted average for USAir and Piedmont;
for the last specification ("market"), this variable is a weighted average
for all carriers on the route.
Independent Variables
QUANT - log number of passengers aggregated across coach, coach discount,
one coupon and two coupons; for the first four specifications for each
route, this variable is firm specific; for the fifth specification ("alt
method"), this variable is the sum of the quantities of USAir and
Piedmont; for the last specification ("market"), this variable is the sum
of the quantities of all carriers on the route.
AVCOST - log real total operating expenditures per revenue passenger mile
INT. RATE - log real cost of capital - Moody's Index of Baa bond yields
INCOME - log real total personal income for the two endpoint metro areas
ADV - log real national advertising and promotion expenses
GASPRICE - log real retail gasoline component of the Consumer Price Index
TIME - quarters 1-27
QTR2-4 - quarterly dummies
DUMP I - dummy variable for first eight quarters preceding Piedmont's
introduction of nonnstop service on Baltimore-Tampa
DUMWO - dummy variable for three quarters in which World Airways competed
on Baltimore-Orlando
DUMEA - dummy for five quarter presence of Eastern Airlines on BostonNorfolk
DUMTW - dummy for TWA's entry into Washington-Norfolk in the twentieth
quarter
DUMUA - dummy for United's entry into Washington-Norfolk in the twentythird quarter
Instrumental Variables
LRFUR
LRPCR
LRPER
LRMER
LRMAR
LRLER
LRLAR

-

log
log
log
log
log
log
log

real
real
real
real
real
real
real

fuel cost per revenue passenger mile (rpm)
pilot and copilot salaries per rpm
personnel expenses per rpm
engine repair materials per rpm
airframe repair materials per rpm
engine repair labor per rpm
airframe repair labor per rpm
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MEMPHIS-NASHVILLE
VARIABLE

QUANT-US

USAIR
PRE
.05
(.72)

QUANT-PI

USAIR
POST

PIED
PRE

.06
(.84)
-.10
(-1.03)

PIED
POST

CCt1B
POST

.12
(.81)
.09
(.66)

-.02
(-.39)

QUANT-CCt1B

.05
(.53)

QUANT-MKT

-.43
(-3.64)

AVCOST-MKT

-.01
(-.03)

-.41
(-.61)

.26
(.38)

.37
(.S1)

.21
(.48)

AVCOST-AH

-.12
(-.32)

.07
(.16)

.19
(.46)

.09
(.19)

.10
(.43)

AVCOST-PI

.02
(.06)

-.02
(-.06)
-.28
(-.84)

-.24
(-.67)
.OS
(.12)

AVCOST-US
INT. RATE
INCCH:

-.07
(-.20)

-.28
(-.72)

-.03
(-.07)

-2.35
(-1.99)

-.39
(-.17)

-2.48
-3.21
-2.10
-1.09
(-.89) (-1.01) (-1.60) (-1.6S)

ADV-PI
ADV-US

MKT

.02
(.20)

.04
(.33)

-.14
-.29
(-.67) (-1.66)

.04
(.54)

-.10
(-.80)

-.10
(-.7S)

.02
(.18)

.01
(.07)

.03
(.46)

r. S4)

.04

.09
(1.67)

.03
(1.29)

QTR3

.01
(,13)

.03
(.36)

.02)
(.29)

.02
(.25)

.05
(1.02)

.02
(.90)

QTR4

-.01
(-.13)

.01
(.22)

-.02
(-.41)

-.03
(-.48)

TIME

.03
(1.47)

.00
(-.13)

.03
(.71)

.04
(.86)

.03
(1.34)

.01
(1.97)

.22

.48
(.85)

.09
(.19)

.04
(.07)

.00
(-.01)

.21
(1.29)

.34
(9.94)

.34
(9.91)

.25
(4.81)

.28
(4.43)

.32
(9.42)

.21
(7.97)

OW

2.4

2.3

1.6

1.7

2.2

1.8

R-SQUARE

.93

.93

.91

.91

.95

.92

QTR2

GASPRICE

(.U)

REPUBDUM
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-.21
(-2.3S)

.01
-.07
(.18) (-2.44)

BOSTON-NORFOLK
VAlUABLE

QUANT-US

USAIR
PRE
-.14
(-2.05)

QUANT-PI

USAIR
POST

PIED
PRE

-.13
(-4.02)
-.48
(-7.35)

PIED
POST

COMB
POST

-.10
(-2.25)
-.43
(-3.71)

-.53
(-4.75)

QUANT-COMB

-.68
(-4.85)

QUANT-MKT

-.83
(-5.57)

AVCOST-MK

.20
(.68)

.08
(.56)

AVCOST-PI

1.47
(4.13)

.63
(3.15)

.32
(1.22)

.28
(1.18)

-.07
(-.30)

.12
(.53)

-.12
(-1.46)

-.07
(-.93)

AVCOST-US
AnV-PI
AnV-US

MKT

.42
(2.12)

-.05
(-.71)

.28
(2.00)

.14
(1.97)

-1.56
(-4.55)

-.17
(-.69)

.09
(.28)

.20
(.67)

.13
(.47)

.20
(.81)

INCOME

-.12
(-.07)

-.65
(-.78)

-1.12
(-.92)

-1.15
(-1.08)

-1.63
(-1.28)

-1.38
(-1.01)

QTR2

.32
(3.36)

.34
(7.55)

.15
(2.44)

.27
(3.55)

.29
(3.84)

.32
(4.42)

QTR3

.23
(2.16)

.27
(5.25)

.03
(.33)

.15
(1.66)

.17
(1.88)

.25
(2.80)

QTR4

.14
(1.03)

.18
(2.97)

-.02
(-.21)

.08
(.86)

.07
(.68)

.13
(1.25)

TIME

-.02
(-1.14)

.02
(1.63)

.04
(2.33)

.04
(2.87)

.04
(2.60)

.03
(1.79)

DUMEA

-.12
(-2.00)

-.15
(-S~41)

-.16
(-3.81)

-.13
(-3.56)

-.10
(-2.57)

.00
(.04)

INT. RATE

-.02
(-.26)

OW

1.3

2.2

1.9

2.2

2.5

1.6

R-SQUARE

.70

.94

.85

.89

.85

.77
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WASHINGTON-NORFOLK
VARIABLE

PIED
PRE

QUANT-US
QUANT-PI

PIED
POST
-.03
(-.57)

-.06
(-.32)

UBAIR
PRE

-.09
(-2.89)

-.04
(-.19)

UBAIR
POST

COMB
POST

-.09
(-2.74)
-.02
(-.30)

QUANT-COMB

-.10
(-5.23)

QUANT-HKT

-.25
(-3.14)

AVCOST-PI

.15
( .41)

AVCOSTUS

-.81
(-1.77)

-.59
(-.95)

INT. RATE

.82
(1.27)

.59
(.66)

.13
(.75)

.12
(.69)

ADV-PI

.52
(1.73)

.18
(.45)

.56
(1.60)

.48
(2.16)

.60
(2.18)

.07
(.74)

ADV-US
GASPRICE

HKT

.11

.10
(.80)

(.80)

.12
(1.45)

.67
(.84)

.50
(.63)

-.59
(-1.35)

-.64
(-1.43)

.35
(.83)

.16
(.42)

TIME

-.01
(-.29)

-.02
(-.51)

.01
(.21)

.00
(.16)

.02
(1.11)

.03
(1.39)

QTR2

-.17
(1.93)

-.11
(-.88)

.03
(.40)

.04
(.47)

-.01
(-.31)

-.01
(-.18)

QTR3

-.05
(-.60)

.00
(-.04)

.03
(.48)

.04
(.54)

.04
(.87)

-.02
(-.39)

QTR4

-.07
(-.89)

-.04
(-.32)

.03
(.47)

.03
(.49)

.00
(-.02)

-.03
(-.65)

1.62
(.64)

1.88
(.74)

-1.34
(-.78)

-1.18
(-.67)

-1.86
(-1.37)

-1.45
(-1.07)

-.21
(1.26)

-.19
(-1.01)

(.69)

.02
(.30)

-.02
(-.38)

.01
(.20)

.10
(.44)

.02
(.07)

-.15
(-.95)

-.16
(-1.01)

.07
(.52)

.15
(1.38)

DW

2.4

2.4

1.2

1.2

1.8

1.11

R-SQUARE

.88

.88

.58

.57

.85

.71

INCCME
DUMl'W

DUMUA

.04
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BALTIMORE-TAMPA
VARIABLE

QUANT-US

USAIR
PRE
-.20
(-2.53)

QUANT-PI

USAIR
POST

PIED
PRE

-.15
(-1.34)
-.10
(-.60)

PIED
POST

COMB
POST

-.01
(-.09)
-.20
(-1.49)

-.18
(-.76)

QUANT-COMB

-.23
(-1.41)

QUANT-MKT
AVCOST-PI

-.41
(-2.29)
.27
(..50)

.29
(.50)

AVCOST-US
AVCOST-EA

MKT

-1.29
-.98
(-2..52) (-1.29)

.38
(.76)

.35
(.58)

-.61
(-1.43)

-.70
(-.67)

-.48
(-1.16)

-.52
(-1..54)

AVCOST-DL

1.57
(2.84)

1.21
(1.42)

.64
(1.21)

.78
(.54)

.84
(1.96)

.68
(1.89)

INT. RATE

.05
(.12)

.27
(.45)

1.41
(3.73)

1.38
(2.52)

.87
(1.98)

.81
(3.08)

.04
(.34)

.05
( .28)

-.07
(-..53)

AnV-PI
AnV-US

.05
(.32)

.03
(.17)

INCOME

7.15
(2.85)

5.78
(1.63)

QTR2

.15
(1.51)

(.98)

.02
(.28)
.02
(.28)

QTR3
QTR4
TIME
DUMPI

-.05
(-2.38)
.08
(.07)

DW

2.1

R-SQUARE

.82

-.10
(-.68)
-.62
(-.25)

-.25
(-.0.5)

5.66
(2.78)

.02
(.31)

.03
(.27)

(.77)

-.01
(-.13)

-.02
(-.25)

-.01
(-.09)

-.08
(-.85)

(-1.78)

.00
(.03)

.04
(.57)

.011

(..53)

-.03
(-.62)

-.05
-1.07)
.00
(.05)

.11

.05

-.03
(-..56)

.07
(2.14)

.08
(.83)

-.01
(-.32)

-.05
(-.25)

-.25
(-1.72)

-.23
(-.88)

-.05
(-..56)

1.9
.81
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3.71
(2.34)
.00
(.02)
-.11

-.07
(-.79)

1.9

1.7

1.7

1.6

.72

.72

.81

.87

BALTIMORE-ORLANDO
VARIABLE

QUANT-US

USAIR
PRE
-.58
(-4.04)

USAIR
POST

PIED
PRE

-.56
(-3.85)

COMB
POST

-.03
(-.20)

.02
(.19)

QUANT-COMB

-.44
(-4.23)

QUANT-MKT
AVCOST-PI

MKT

-.18
(-2.28)

-.05
(-.40)

QUANT-PI

PIED
POST

-.86
(-4.27)
.31
(.48

.18
(.25)

AVCOST-US

.90
(1.81)

.65
(1.41)

AVCOST-EA

.02
(.03)

.03
(.04)

.05
(.10)

.08
(.19)

-.08
(-.18)

AVCOST-DL

.65
(1.10)

.61
(1.00)

-.06
(-.11)

.06
(.13)

.47
(1.13)

INT. RATE

-.23
(-.46)

-.21
(-.42)

.44
(.97)

u. 53)

.65

.22
(.71)

-.35
(-.80)

INCOME-B

-15.31
(-1.79)

-13.13
(-1.41)

4.39
(.70)

-5.62
(-.76)

-.18
(-.03)

-3.33
(-.64)

INCOME-O

21.90
(2.11)

19.35
(1.71)

.06
(.01)

10.59
(1.16)

6.29
(.65)

3.91
(.53)

.13
(1.04)

.12
Cl.01)

-.20
(-1.44)

ADV-PI
ADV-US

-.20
(-1.02)

(-1. 07)

QTR2

.40
(2.44)

.34
(1.73)

.14
(1.21)

.23
(2.08)

.10
(1.19)

.09
(1.01)

QTR3

.42
(1.96)

.35
(1.30)

.13
(.73)

.29
(1.63)

.06
(.37)

.00
(-.03)

QTR4

.63
(2.11)

.54
(1.57)

.11
(.46)

.37
Cl.54)

.15
(.60)

.02
(.09)

TIME

-.22
(-1.96)

-.19
(-1.59)

-.01
(-.12)

-.10
(-1.03)

-.07
(-.70)

-.12
(-1.14)

-.15
(-1.20)

-.19
(-1.96)

-.12
(-1.30)

-.21
(-2.81)

DUMWO

-.24

.05
(.49)

-.03
(-.37)

-.08
(-1.12)

DW

2.1

2.0

1.8

2.0

2.2

1.5

R-SQUARE

.83

.84

.77

.82

.85

.77
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